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Key figures
INFLATION TARGET
2%
Norges Bank’s objective is to ensure low 
and stable inflation around the target of 2%, 
while contributing to high and stable output 
 and employment and to countering the 
build-up of financial imbalances.
POLICY RATE
1.50%
Norges Bank’s policy rate has been 
1.50% since 20 September 2019.
COUNTERCYCLICAL CAPITAL BUFFER
2%
The countercyclical capital buffer rate is 2%. 
With effect from 31 December 2019, 
the rate will be raised to 2.5%.
POLICY RATE FORECAST
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This Monetary Policy Report is based on information in the period to 13 December 2019 and was published on 
19 December 2019, the day after the Executive Board’s monetary policy meeting.
The Report is available at www.norges-bank.no.
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MONETARY POLICY IN NORWAY
OBJECTIVE
Monetary policy shall maintain monetary stability by keeping inflation low and stable. The operational 
target of monetary policy shall be annual consumer price inflation of close to 2% over time. Inflation  targeting 
shall be forward-looking and flexible so that it can contribute to high and stable output and employment 
and to countering the build-up of financial imbalances.
IMPLEMENTATION
Norges Bank sets its policy rate with the aim of stabilising inflation around the target in the medium term. 
The horizon will depend on the disturbances to which the economy is exposed and the effects on the 
outlook for inflation and the real economy. In its conduct of monetary policy, Norges Bank takes into account 
indicators of underlying consumer price inflation.
DECISION PROCESS
The policy rate is set by Norges Bank’s Executive Board. Policy rate decisions are normally taken at the 
Executive Board’s monetary policy meetings. The Executive Board holds eight monetary policy meetings 
per year. The Monetary Policy Report is published four times a year in connection with four of the monetary 
policy meetings. At a meeting one to two weeks before the publication of the Report, the background for 
the monetary policy assessment is presented to and discussed by the Executive Board. On the basis of the 
analysis and discussion, the Executive Board assesses the consequences for future interest rate develop-
ments. The final policy rate decision is made on the day prior to the publication of the Report. In the Report, 
the Board’s assessment of the economic outlook and monetary policy is presented in “Executive Board’s 
assessment”.
REPORTING
Norges Bank places emphasis on transparency in its monetary policy communication. The Bank reports on 
the conduct of monetary policy in its Annual Report. The assessments on which interest rate setting is based 
are published regularly in the Monetary Policy Report and elsewhere.
COUNTERCYCLICAL CAPITAL BUFFER
The objective of the countercyclical capital buffer is to increase banks’ resilience and to lessen the  amplifying 
effects of bank lending during downturns.
The Ministry of Finance sets the level of the buffer four times a year. Norges Bank draws up a decision basis 
and provides advice to the Ministry regarding the level of the buffer. The advice is submitted to the  Ministry 
of Finance in connection with the publication of Norges Bank’s Monetary Policy Report. The advice is 
 published when the Ministry of Finance has made its decision.
Banks should build up and hold a countercyclical capital buffer when financial imbalances are building up 
or have built up. In the event of a severe downturn and clearly reduced access to credit, the buffer rate 
should be lowered to counteract tighter bank lending. The buffer rate shall  as a rule be set at between 0% 
and 2.5% of banks’ risk-weighted assets, but may be set higher in exceptional circumstances.
DECISION PROCESS FOR MONETARY POLICY REPORT 4/19
At its meeting on 11 December 2019, the Executive Board discussed the economic outlook, the monetary 
policy stance and the need for a countercyclical capital buffer for banks. On the basis of this discussion and 
a recommendation from Norges Bank’s management, the Executive Board made its decision on the policy 
rate at its meeting on 18 December 2019. The Executive Board also approved Norges Bank’s advice to the 
 Ministry of Finance on the level of the countercyclical capital buffer.
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Executive Board’s 
assessment
Norges Bank’s Executive Board has decided to keep the policy rate unchanged at 1.50%. 
The Executive Board’s current assessment of the outlook and balance of risks suggests 
that the policy rate will most likely remain at this level in the coming period.
GDP growth among Norway’s trading partners slowed through 2018 and has been 
moderate in 2019. Since the September 2019 Monetary Policy Report, trading partner 
growth has been a little higher than expected, but the outlook ahead is little changed. 
Unemployment is low in many countries, but employment growth has recently fallen 
somewhat. It now appears that the UK will leave the EU in the new year with a withdrawal 
agreement. The US and China have reached a limited trade agreement. Since the Sep-
tember Report, trading partner forward rates have edged up. Oil prices have also risen.
Since 2016, growth in the Norwegian economy has been solid. Employment has risen, 
and unemployment has fallen. The upswing in the mainland economy has continued 
in 2019. Looking ahead, there are prospects that large investment projects on the con-
tinental shelf will be completed. This will dampen growth in the Norwegian economy.
Growth in the mainland economy slowed in autumn and has been a little lower than 
expected. The enterprises in Norges Bank’s Regional Network expect a further slight 
decline over the next half-year. Unemployment has been stable and in line with the 
projections in the September Report, but employment rose somewhat less than 
expected in Q3. Overall, labour market developments have been slightly weaker than 
projected, and capacity utilisation appears to be a little lower than previously assumed.
Consumer price inflation has moderated in 2019, after having picked up markedly through 
2018. Lower electricity price inflation in particular has restrained the general rise in 
prices. Underlying inflation has also moderated and has been fairly stable at close to 
2% since summer.
Since the September Report, inflation has been broadly in line with that projected. The 
12-month rise in the consumer price index (CPI) was 1.6% in November. Adjusted for 
tax changes and excluding energy products (CPI-ATE), inflation was 2.0%. Tighter labour 
market conditions in recent years have pushed up wage growth. Social partners’ wage 
expectations suggest that wage growth will be moderate ahead.
The krone has depreciated considerably and is weaker than projected in September. A 
weaker krone will lift imported goods inflation. The krone depreciation also improves 
Norwegian firms’ cost-competitiveness and may pull up demand for Norwegian goods 
and services.
Financial imbalances are no longer building up, and there are now some signs that they 
are receding. Household debt growth has abated over the past few years, and house 
price inflation has been moderate. Since the September Report, house price inflation 
and household debt growth have been a little lower than expected.
In its discussion of the risk outlook, the Executive Board focused on trade tensions, 
which continue to be a source of uncertainty about global developments. Foreign inter-
est rates are very low. The krone has depreciated considerably, and the impact of the 
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depreciation on price and wage inflation is uncertain. The Norwegian economy seems 
to be near a cyclical peak. The upswing may continue longer than assumed if invest-
ment growth remains elevated longer. On the other hand, growth may prove lower than 
projected if, for example, trade tensions deepen and oil prices fall.
The operational target of monetary policy is annual consumer price inflation of close 
to 2% over time. Inflation targeting shall be forward-looking and flexible, so that it can 
contribute to high and stable output and employment and to countering the build-up 
of financial imbalances.
Since September 2018, the policy rate has been raised gradually. The monetary stance 
has become less expansionary. Inflation is close to the inflation target, and capacity 
utilisation is somewhat above a normal level. The krone depreciation will likely push up 
inflation somewhat, while it seems that wage growth will remain moderate ahead. 
Growth in the mainland economy is slowing. With a policy rate close to the current 
level, there are prospects that inflation will remain close to the inflation target, and that 
capacity utilisation will decline towards a normal level.
In the Executive Board’s assessment, the overall outlook and balance of risks suggest 
a policy rate at close to the current level ahead. The policy rate forecast is broadly 
unchanged from the September Report. A weaker-than-projected krone implies in 
isolation a higher policy rate path. On the other hand, the upturn in the Norwegian 
economy appears to be a little more moderate than previously assumed. In isolation, 
this suggests a slightly lower rate path. Should the economic outlook or balance of risks 
change, interest rate developments may also differ from the forecast.
The Executive Board decided to keep the policy rate unchanged at 1.50%. The Executive 
Board’s current assessment of the outlook and balance of risks suggests that the policy 
rate will most likely remain at this level in the coming period. The decision was unani-
mous.
Øystein Olsen
18 December 2019
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Chart 1.1c Consumer price index (CPI) with fan chart1).
Four-quarter change. Percent. 2013 Q1 – 2022 Q42)     
1) The fan chart is based on historical experience and stochastic simulations in Norges Bank's main
macroeconomic model, NEMO. 2) Projections for 2019 Q4 – 2022 Q4. 
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
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Chart 1.1a Policy rate with fan chart1).
Percent. 2013 Q1 – 2022 Q4 2)           
1) The fan chart is based on historical experience and stochastic simulations in Norges Bank's main
macroeconomic model, NEMO. It does not take into account that a lower bound for the interest rate
exists. 2) Projections for 2019 Q4 – 2022 Q4. 
Source: Norges Bank 
Projections MPR 4/19
Projections MPR 3/19
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Chart 1.1c Consumer price index (CPI) with fan chart1).
Four-quarter change. Percent. 2013 Q1 – 2022 Q42)     
1) The fan chart is based on historical experience and stochastic simulations in Norges Bank's main
macroeconomic model, NEMO. 2) Projections for 2019 Q4 – 2022 Q4. 
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
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Chart 1.1d CPI-ATE1) with fan chart2).         
Four-quarter change. Percent. 2013 Q1 – 2022 Q43)
1) CPI adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy products. 2) The fan chart is based on historical
experience and stochastic simulations in Norges Bank's main macroeconomic model, NEMO. 
3) Projections for 2019 Q4 – 2022 Q4. 
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
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Chart 1.1a Policy rate with fan chart1).
Percent. 2013 Q1 – 2022 Q4 2)           
1) The fan chart is based on historical experience and stochastic simulations in Norges Bank's main
macroeconomic model, NEMO. It does not take into account that a lower bound for the interest rate
exists. 2) Projections for 2019 Q4 – 2022 Q4. 
Source: Norges Bank 
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Chart 1.1b Estimated output gap1) with fan chart2).
Percent. 2013 Q1 – 2022 Q4                              
1) The output gap measures the percentage deviation between mainland GDP and estimated potential
mainland GDP. 2) The fan chart is based on historical experience and stochastic simulations in Norges
Bank's main macroeconomic model, NEMO. 
Source: Norges Bank 
Projections MPR 4/19
Projections MPR 3/19
Growth in the Norwegian economy has been solid since 2016. Employment has risen, and 
unemployment has fallen. Inflation is close to the inflation target, and capacity utilisation 
appears to be somewhat above a normal level. Looking ahead, slightly lower growth is 
expected in the mainland economy.
The policy rate was kept unchanged at 1.50% at this monetary policy meeting, and the 
forecast indicates that the policy rate will remain close to that level ahead. The policy rate 
forecast is broadly unchanged from the September 2019 Monetary Policy Report. A weaker-
than-projected krone suggests in isolation a higher policy rate path. A slightly more moderate 
upswing in the Norwegian economy than previously projected pulls in the opposite direction.
With a policy rate in line with the forecast, inflation is projected to remain close to the 
inflation target in the years ahead, at the same time as unemployment remains low.
PART 1: MONETARY POLICY
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1.1 GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS AND OUTLOOK
Continued moderate growth
GDP growth among Norway’s main trading partners 
slowed through 2018 and has been moderate so far 
in 2019. Developments have reflected among other 
things uncertainty surrounding increased trade 
restrictions and the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. 
Since the time of Monetary Policy Report 3/19, pub-
lished on 19 September, the US and China have 
reached a limited trade agreement, and it now 
appears that the UK will leave the EU in the new year 
with a withdrawal agreement. Nevertheless, uncer-
tainty is expected to weigh on growth also in 2020 
(Chart 1.2). Import growth among trading partners 
appears to be a little lower in 2019 and 2020 than 
projected in the September Report.
Wage growth among Norway’s trading partners has 
picked up over the past few years, and there are signs 
of a slight rise in underlying inflation. Unemployment 
is low in many countries, and capacity utilisation is 
close to a normal level. At the same time, employ-
ment growth has recently fallen somewhat. In the 
period ahead, both price and wage inflation are 
expected to move up, but less than previously pro-
jected.
Since the September Report, the US Federal Reserve 
has lowered its policy rate twice. Trading partner 
forward rates have edged up (Chart 1.3). Market 
expectations indicate that interest rates will remain 
close to current levels throughout the projection 
period.
Oil spot prices are somewhat higher than at the time 
of the September Report (Chart 1.4). Futures prices 
towards the end of the projection period are little 
changed.
1.2 THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN NORWAY
The Norwegian economy near a cyclical peak
Growth in the Norwegian economy has been solid 
since 2016. The global upturn, improved cost-com-
petitiveness and higher oil prices have helped lift 
activity, as have low interest rates.
Mainland GDP growth was lower in 2019 Q3 than pre-
viously projected (Chart 1.5). Monthly national 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Chart 1.4 Oil price.1) USD/barrel. January 2013 – December 20222)
1) Brent Blend. 2) Futures prices on 13 September 2019 for MPR 3/19 and on 13 December 2019 
for MPR 4/19. 
Sources: Thomson Reuters and Norges Bank 
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Chart 1.2 GDP for Norway's trading partners1).
Annual change. Percent. 2013 – 2022 2)        
1) Export weights. Twenty-five main trading partners. 2) Projections for 2019 – 2022. 
Sources: Thomson Reuters and Norges Bank 
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Chart 1.3 Three-month money market rates for Norway's trading partners.1)
Percent. 2013 Q1 – 2022 Q4 2)                                            
1) Based on money market rates and interest rate swaps. See Norges Bank (2015) "Calculation of the
aggregate for trading partner interest rates". Norges Bank Papers 2/2015. 2) Forward rates at 13 September
2019 for MPR 3/19 and 13 December 2019 for MPR 4/19. 
Sources: Thomson Reuters and Norges Bank 
Forward rates MPR 4/19
Forward rates MPR 3/19
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accounts showed weak growth in October. According 
to Norges Bank’s Regional Network, output growth 
has slowed in recent months. Contacts expect a con-
tinued slight decline in growth over the next half-year. 
Mainland GDP is projected to grow at 2.5% in 2019. 
Growth in the Norwegian economy is expected to 
slow in 2020.
Capacity utilisation has risen a little since the Sep-
tember Report, but less than expected. Unemploy-
ment has been stable and consistent with the Sep-
tember projections, while employment has risen 
somewhat less than projected. The Bank’s Regional 
Network indicates that employment growth will con-
tinue to soften in the coming months (Chart 1.6). The 
economy now seems to be near a cyclical peak. 
Capacity utilisation is projected to increase further in 
Q4, declining thereafter.
Household debt growth has abated over the past few 
years, and house price inflation has been moderate.
Inflation close to target
After rising markedly through 2018, consumer price 
inflation has moderated in 2019, reflecting in particu-
lar a slower rise in electricity prices.
The 12-month rise in the consumer price index (CPI) 
was 1.6% in November. Adjusted for tax changes and 
excluding energy products (CPI-ATE), inflation was 
2.0%. Inflation has been broadly as projected in the 
September Report. Underlying inflation is expected 
to remain close to 2% in the coming period (Chart 
1.7).
Tighter labour market conditions have pushed up 
wage growth over the past few years. Annual wage 
growth of 3.4% is projected for 2019. The social part-
ners expect that wage growth will be just above 3% 
in the coming years.
The krone has depreciated considerably and is weaker 
than projected in September, probably reflecting in 
part persistent uncertainty surrounding global devel-
opments. The deterioration in the terms of trade after 
the oil price fall in 2014 and uncertainty about future 
activity levels in the oil sector may also have weighed 
on the krone.
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Chart 1.5 GDP for mainland Norway1) and the Regional Network's indicator
of output growth2). Quarterly change. Percent. 2013 Q1 – 2020 Q13)  
1) Seasonally adjusted. 2) Reported output growth the past three months converted to quarterly figures.
Quarterly figures are calculated by weighting three-month figures on the basis of survey timing. For 2019
Q4, a weighting of historical and expected growth is used, while for 2020 Q1, expected growth is used. 
3) Projections for 2019 Q3 – 2020 Q1.  
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank    
GDP mainland Norway
Regional Network
Projection MPR 4/19
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Chart 1.6 Employment according to the quarterly national accounts1) and Regional
Network2). Quarterly change. Percent. 2013 Q1 – 2020 Q13)
1) Seasonally adjusted. 2) Reported employment growth the past three months converted to quarterly
figures. Quarterly figures are calculated by weighting three-month figures on the basis of survey timing. For
2019 Q4, a weighting of historical and expected growth is used, while for 2020 Q1, expected growth is used.
3) Projections for 2019 Q4 – 2020 Q1. 
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
Quarterly national accounts
Regional Network
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Chart 1.7 CPI and CPI-ATE1).                              
Twelve-month change. Percent. January 2013 – March 2020 2)
1) CPI adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy products. 2) Projections for 
December 2019 – March 2020. 
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
CPI
CPI-ATE
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Chart 1.9 GDP for mainland Norway.1) Annual change. Percent. 2013 – 2022 2)
1) Working-day adjusted. 2) Projections for 2019 – 2022. 
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
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Chart 1.8 Import-weighted exchange rate index (I-44).1) 2013 Q1 – 2022 Q4 2)
1) A positive slope denotes a weaker krone exchange rate. 2) Projections for 2019 Q4 – 2022 Q4. 
Sources: Thomson Reuters and Norges Bank 
Projections MPR 4/19
Projections MPR 3/19
1.3 MONETARY POLICY AND PROJECTIONS
Policy rate close to the current level
The operational target of monetary policy is annual 
consumer price inflation of close to 2% over time. 
Inflation targeting shall be forward-looking and flex-
ible so that it can contribute to high and stable output 
and employment and to countering the build-up of 
financial imbalances.
Since September 2018, the policy rate has been raised 
gradually. The monetary stance has become less 
expansionary. The Executive Board has decided to 
keep the policy rate unchanged at 1.50%, and the 
forecast indicates that the rate will remain close to 
that level ahead (Chart 1.1a).
The policy rate forecast is broadly unchanged from 
the September Report. A weaker-than-projected 
krone implies in isolation a higher policy rate path. 
On the other hand, the upswing in the Norwegian 
economy appears to be a little more moderate than 
previously assumed. In isolation, this suggests a lower 
rate path. With a policy rate in line with the forecast 
in this Report, the average residential mortgage rate 
is projected to remain approximately unchanged in 
the coming years and be 3.1% in 2022.
The projections are uncertain, and the uncertainty 
increases through the projection period. Should the 
economic outlook or balance of risks change, interest 
rate developments may also differ from the forecast.
Normal capacity utilisation and inflation close to 
target
With a policy rate in line with the forecast in this 
Report, capacity utilisation is projected to drift down 
towards a normal level (Chart 1.1b). The projections 
for capacity utilisation are a little lower than in the 
September Report for the next few years and little 
changed towards the end of the projection period.
Inflation is projected to remain close to the target in 
the coming years (Charts 1.1c-d). Owing to the recent 
krone depreciation, the inflation projections are a little 
higher than in the September Report. The projections 
for the krone are weaker than in September through-
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Chart 1.10 Unemployment according to LFS1) and NAV2).                     
Share of the labour force. Seasonally adjusted. Percent. 2013 Q1 – 2022 Q43)
1) Labour Force Survey. 2) Registered unemployment. 3) Projections for 2019 Q4 – 2022 Q4. 
Sources: Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV), Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
LFS
NAV
Projections MPR 4/19
Projections MPR 3/19
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Chart 1.11 Wages. Annual change. Percent. 2013 – 2022 1)
1) Projections for 2019 – 2022. 2) Nominal wage deflated by the CPI. 
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
Nominal wages
Real wages2)
Projections MPR 4/19
Projections MPR 3/19
Growth in the mainland economy is expected to slow 
in the years ahead (Chart 1.9). Completions of large 
investment projects on the Norwegian shelf drag 
down on growth. A weaker krone has the opposite 
effect. The projections for GDP growth are little 
changed since September.
Prospects for continued growth in the Norwegian 
economy suggest that finding a job will be easier in 
the years ahead, but employment growth is expected 
to move down through the projection period. The 
projections indicate that unemployment will remain 
low (Chart 1.10). In the projection, wage growth 
remains fairly steady ahead (Chart 1.11). Low profit-
ability in some business sectors restrains wage 
growth. Capacity utilisation in the Norwegian economy 
above a normal level has the opposite effect. Despite 
prospects for slightly higher inflation, the wage pro-
jections are slightly lower than in the September 
Report on the back of lower capacity utilisation.
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Chart 2.1 Equity prices in selected countries.1)                 
Index. 2 January 2013 = 100. 2 January 2013 – 13 December 20192)
1) Standard and Poor's 500 Index (US). Euro Stoxx 50 Index (Europe).                       
Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 Index (UK). MSCI Emerging Markets Index (emerging economies).
Oslo Børs Benchmark Index (Norway). 2) MPR 3/19 was based on information in the period up  
to 13 September 2019, indicated by the vertical line.                                           
Source: Bloomberg                                                                               
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Chart 2.2 Yields on 10-year government bonds in selected countries.
Percent. 2 January 2013 – 13 December 2019 1)                   
1) MPR 3/19 was based on information in the period up to 13 September 2019, indicated by the
vertical line.                                                                                   
Source: Bloomberg                                                                                
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2.1 GROWTH, PRICES AND INTEREST RATES
Growth prospects remain moderate
Growth among trading partners has slowed since 2017. 
Developments among Norway’s main trading partners 
have been marked by trade tensions and a decline in 
manufacturing in particular. Since the September 
Report, the US and China have reached a limited trade 
agreement which entails a small reduction in tariffs 
between the two countries. A box on page 17 dis-
cusses the effects of the trade conflicts on growth in 
Norway and trading partners and different scenarios 
for developments ahead. At the same time, it now 
appears that the UK will exit the EU at the beginning 
of 2020 with a withdrawal agreement. Both advanced 
and emerging economy equity markets have recorded 
gains (Chart 2.1). Long-term interest rates have edged 
up in a number of European countries, while US long 
rates are broadly unchanged (Chart 2.2). The US 
Federal Reserve has cut its policy rate twice since the 
September Report. Overall, market expectations con-
cerning policy rates among main trading partners have 
risen since September (Chart 2.3).
GDP growth among trading partners was broadly 
unchanged between Q2 and Q3. Growth in the UK, 
US and China has been somewhat stronger than 
expected. Activity in the services sector has remained 
relatively robust, and activity indicators suggest that 
manufacturing is stabilising (Chart 2.4). Overall, 
capacity utilisation is assumed to be close to a normal 
level.
Labour market developments have been positive in 
recent years, with a rise in employment and a fall in 
unemployment, contributing to solid growth in 
household consumption. Recently, however, employ-
ment growth has slowed, and several indicators point 
to further weakening ahead (Chart 2.5), which is 
expected to push down consumption growth some-
what. Trade- and Brexit-related uncertainties have 
acted as a drag on investment in recent years, which 
could dampen underlying growth potential.
2 The global economy
Growth among trading partners has slowed since 2017, partly reflecting uncertainty relating 
to increased trade restrictions and the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. Capacity utilisation is 
close to a normal level, and unemployment is low. GDP growth is projected to pick up slightly 
towards the end of the projection period, broadly as projected in the September Report. 
Interest rates among trading partners have edged up since the previous Report.
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Chart 2.3 Policy rates and estimated forward rates1) in selected countries.
Percent. 1 January 2013 – 31 December 2022 2)                              
1) Forward rates at 13 September 2019 (MPR 3/19) and 13 December 2019 (MPR 4/19). Forward rates
are estimated based on Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rates. 2) Daily data through 13 December 2019.
Quarterly data from 2020 Q1. 3) ECB deposit facility rate. 
Sources: Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters and Norges Bank 
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Chart 2.4 PMI for Norway's trading partners.1)             
Seasonally adjusted. Index.2) January 2013 – November 2019
1) Export weights. 25 main trading partners. 2) Survey of purchasing managers. Diffusion index
centred around 50.                                                                                      
Sources: Thomson Reuters and Norges Bank                                                                
Manufacturing PMI
Services PMI
New export orders, manufacturing PMI
Our projections are based on the assumption that no 
further trade policy measures will be taken beyond the 
changes in tariffs and restrictions that are already 
imposed or agreed. It is also assumed that the UK will 
both leave the EU with a withdrawal agreement and 
come to an agreement with the EU on a trade deal. 
Given these assumptions, the uncertainty surrounding 
global economic developments will also dampen growth 
in 2020. The uncertainty is expected to diminish further 
out, contributing to a moderate investment upswing. 
Expansionary monetary policies are making a positive 
contribution in many countries, and fiscal policy is likely 
to prove more expansionary in 2020 in a number of 
European countries than assumed earlier. Trading 
partner GDP growth is expected to move up slightly as 
investment willingness picks up again (Annex Table 1). 
The projections for GDP growth are broadly the same 
as in the September Report. Import growth for main 
trading partners has been lower than expected, and the 
projection for 2019 and 2020 has been revised down in 
relation to the September Report (Chart 2.6).
Slightly lower inflation projection
Low energy and food price inflation has pulled down 
overall inflation among main trading partners in recent 
years (Chart 2.7). However, core inflation, which 
excludes those components, has shown some 
increase in recent months, likely accounted for by a 
pick-up in wage growth in both the US and Europe in 
the course of 2018. Wage growth continued to rise 
into 2019, but at a slower pace than expected. The 
projections for wage growth in the years ahead are 
therefore slightly lower than in the September Report, 
which will contribute to weaker inflation than expected 
earlier. Consumer price inflation is now projected at 
just below 2% in 2019 and 2020, before edging higher 
towards the end of the projection period (Annex Table 
2). Oil spot prices have recently been around USD 65 
per barrel. This is higher than at the time of the Sep-
tember Report, while futures prices at the end of 2022 
are broadly the same as in September (Chart 1.4). Oil 
prices are discussed in a box on page 16.
The rise in prices for Norwegian consumer goods 
imports, measured in foreign currency terms, accel-
erated rapidly through 2018. Since the September 
Report, the rate of increase has moderated and been 
slightly lower than projected for most groups of 
goods. The projections have been revised down for 
2019 (Annex Table 2).
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Chart 2.5 Global PMI: Employment.1)                        
Seasonally adjusted. Index.2) January 2013 – November 2019
1) Weights based on contribution to global production of goods and services. 2) Survey of purchasing
managers. Diffusion index centred around 50. Three-month moving average.                                      
Source: Thomson Reuters                                                                                       
Manufacturing PMI
Services PMI
Combined PMI
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Downside risks still dominate
There is still considerable uncertainty associated with 
global developments. Financial market uncertainty 
indicators have fallen since the September Report, 
while text-based uncertainty indicators have remained 
at high levels (Chart 2.8). It is uncertain to what extent 
the decline in global manufacturing will impact other 
sectors of the economy. If new trade agreements are 
reached or existing tariffs reduced further, growth 
may prove stronger than projected. If the trade con-
flicts re-escalate, trading-partner growth could prove 
lower than projected. Norges Bank’s estimations 
indicate that the negative consequences of an esca-
lation may be considerably more pronounced than 
the positive effects of a solution to the trade conflicts 
(for further details, see box on trade conflicts on page 
17). If the UK and the EU do not agree on a trade deal, 
growth in Europe will likely be lower than currently 
projected. Early clarification between the UK and the 
EU could lead to stronger-than-projected growth in 
Europe, (see box in Monetary Policy Report 3/19).
2.2 COUNTRIES AND REGIONS
US expansion continues
The US economy continues to expand, and capacity 
utilisation is likely higher than normal. GDP growth 
was 0.5% in both Q2 and Q3 (Chart 2.9). Growth is 
supported by continued strong growth in private con-
sumption and an upswing in housing investment. 
Business investment, on the other hand, has fallen 
over two consecutive quarters, and imports are 
approximately unchanged so far in 2019. Employment 
growth has slowed somewhat in recent months, and 
wage growth has been stable just above 3%.
The US Federal Reserve has lowered its policy rate 
twice since the September Report, and the target 
range is now 1.50% – 1.75%. Forward rates indicate a 
rate cut in autumn 2020.
GPD growth is projected to slow from 2.3% in 2019 
to 2.0% in 2020. The projections are higher than in 
the September Report. The slowing is attributable to 
fading effects of earlier tax cuts and public spending 
increases. Employment growth is also expected to 
slow gradually as available labour resources decline. 
At the same time, lower interest rates will likely stim-
ulate a further rise in housing investment. The 
adopted tariff increases are expected to push up con-
sumer price inflation slightly. The projections for 
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Chart 2.7 Headline and core inflation in selected countries.1)
Twelve-month change. Percent. January 2013 – October 2019       
1) Import weights. US, euro area, UK and Sweden. 2) US: excluding food and energy.
UK and euro area: excluding food, tobacco, alcohol and energy. Sweden: excluding energy.    
Sources: Thomson Reuters and Norges Bank                                                    
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Chart 2.8 Global economic policy uncertainty.1)
Index.2) January 2013 – November 2019         
1) Indicator measuring the frequency of the word "uncertainty" connected to "economics" and "policy"
in news articles. 2) Weighted by PPP-adjusted GDP. A positive slope denotes greater uncertainty.    
Source: policyuncertainty.com                                                                            
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Chart 2.6 Imports for Norway's trading partners.1)
Annual change. Percent. 2013 – 2022 2)            
1) Export weights. 25 main trading partners. 2) Projections for 2019 – 2022.
Sources: Thomson Reuters and Norges Bank                                               
Projections MPR 4/19
Porjections MPR 3/19
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underlying inflation are nevertheless slightly lower 
than in the September Report owing to lower-than-
expected wage growth and an expected reduction 
of tariffs on Chinese goods as the limited trade agree-
ment between the US and China enters into force.
Low growth in the euro area
Euro-area economic growth has slowed markedly 
since the cyclical peak in 2017. Growth in Q3 was 
0.2%, broadly as expected in the September Report. 
Manufacturing activity indicators have improved 
slightly in recent months, while service sector indica-
tors have fallen somewhat (Chart 2.10). Capacity uti-
lisation for the euro area as a whole is close to a 
normal level.
The European Central Bank (ECB) has resumed asset 
purchases and introduced a new two-tier system for 
reserve remuneration for credit institutions. Money 
market rates have risen slightly since the September 
Report. The ECB has not communicated any new 
monetary policy signals since the September Report, 
and forward rates indicate unchanged policy rates in 
the period to 2022.
Expansionary fiscal policies are expected to make a 
positive contribution to economic activity in the 
coming years. Low real interest rates will support 
growth. As the uncertainty relating to trade conflicts 
and the UK’s exit from the EU lessens, investment 
and export growth should pick up. Compared with 
the September Report, the growth projections have 
been revised up slightly for 2019 and down slightly 
for 2022. The inflation projections are broadly 
unchanged from the September Report.
Growth in emerging economies likely to pick up 
The trade conflict between the US and China has 
weighed on growth in a number of Asian economies 
(Chart 2.11). Four-quarter GDP growth in China slowed 
to 6% in Q3, the weakest growth rate in over 20 years. 
Chinese GDP growth is projected to slow from 6.1% 
in 2019 to 5.6% in 2022. The projections are somewhat 
higher than in the September Report as a result of the 
limited trade agreement between the US and China. 
After a period of particularly low growth in Brazil, 
India, Russia and Turkey, the recovery in these coun-
tries is expected to gather pace, supporting an 
increase in growth for emerging economies as a 
whole through the period.
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Chart 2.9 GDP in the US and euro area.       
Quarterly growth. Percent. Q1 2019 – Q3 2019
Source: Thomson Reuters
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Chart 2.10 PMI in the euro area.                              
Seasonally adjusted. Index.1) January 2013 – November 2019
1) Survey of purchasing managers. Diffusion index centred around 50.
Source: Thomson Reuters                                                  
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Chart 2.11 PMI in emerging economies.1)                    
Seasonally adjusted. Index.2) January 2013 – November 2019
1) Export weights. China, Thailand, Turkey, India, Russia, Indonesia and Poland.  2) Survey of
purchasing managers. Diffusion index centred around 50.                                                 
Sources: Markit, Thomson Reuters, Statistics Norway and Norges Bank                                     
Manufacturing PMI
Manufacturing PMI excluding China
New export orders, manufacturing PMI
New export orders, manufacturing PMI excluding China
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Chart 2.A Shale oil production1) and number of rigs in the US.
Twelve-month growth. January 2013 – December 20192)          
1) Growth measured in thousands of barrels per day. 2) Data for November and December 2019 for shale oil
production are projections from the US Energy Information Administration. Number of rigs includes data            
through October 2019.                                                                                             
Sources: US Energy Information Administration and Norges Bank                                                     
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Chart 2.B Natural gas prices1).           
USD/MMBtu. January 2010 – December 2022 2)
1) Value-weighted average of prices for natural gas in the Netherlands and the UK.       
2) Futures prices on 13 September 2019 for MPR 3/19 and on 13 December 2019 for MPR 4/19.
Sources: Norwegian Petroleum, Thomson Reuters and Norges Bank                                 
Europe natural gas
Asia LNG
Futures prices MPR 4/19
Futures prices MPR 3/19
DEVELOPMENTS IN OIL AND GAS PRICES
Oil spot prices have recently been around USD 65 per barrel. Prices are higher than at the time of the Sep-
tember Report. Growth in global oil consumption was modest in the first half of 2019, but has picked up so 
far in the latter half of the year and is expected to be higher in 2020 than in 2019. A further fall in production 
in Iran and Venezuela is pushing down global oil supply. Growth in US shale production has slowed recently 
and may continue to slow (Chart 2.A). On the other hand, oil production is rising in countries such as Brazil 
and Norway. In order to prevent excess oil supply, OPEC+ decided to cut output further from the beginning 
of 2020 and to the end of Q1. Cuts will be reassessed in March 2020 according to plan.
Prices are assumed to move in line with futures prices (Chart 1.4). Futures prices now indicate that oil prices 
will fall to around USD 57 per barrel at end-2022, approximately as anticipated in September.
Prices could fall more than implied by futures prices if uncertainty increases again and global economic 
prospects weaken. Energy efficiency gains and a shift towards new energy sources to meet long-term 
climate goals in the Paris Agreement could dampen growth in oil consumption over time. Prices may also 
stay low if growth in non-OPEC oil production proves higher than expected.
On the other hand, prices may increase if US sanctions against Iran and Venezuela lead to a further decline 
in oil exports from those countries. If OPEC+ production restrictions are largely adhered to, OECD oil inven-
tories may remain low. Political tensions in the Middle East may flare up again. Over time, oil prices may 
increase because of higher costs for developing remaining oil reserves, owing to, for example, more demand-
ing geological conditions or higher return requirements due to greater risk.
An ample supply of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and Russian pipeline gas has resulted in abundant gas 
inventories in Northwest Europe, which contributed to a marked fall in European gas prices in the first half 
of 2019 (Chart 2.B). Since November, prices have rebounded. Gas prices normally rise as winter approaches, 
but the upswing could also reflect uncertainty about Russian gas transit across Ukraine to Europe from the 
beginning of 2020.
Gas prices are assumed to move in line with futures prices. Futures prices for European gas indicate some-
what higher prices ahead, but prices for 2020 are lower than in the previous Report. If Russian gas transit 
across Ukraine is maintained into 2020, gas prices may fall again given that gas inventories in Northwest 
Europe are at a historically high level. Continued ample LNG supply from countries such as the US and 
Australia could also curb the price rise. A cold winter in the Northern Hemisphere and a pick-up in Asian 
LNG imports could have the opposite effect.
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Chart 2.C Global trade in goods.1)                       
Twelve-month change. Percent. January 2005 – September 2019
1) The index for global trade in goods is an average of global imports and exports.
Sources: Thomson Reuters and Norges Bank                                                
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Chart 2.B Natural gas prices1).           
USD/MMBtu. January 2010 – December 2022 2)
1) Value-weighted average of prices for natural gas in the Netherlands and the UK.       
2) Futures prices on 13 September 2019 for MPR 3/19 and on 13 December 2019 for MPR 4/19.
Sources: Norwegian Petroleum, Thomson Reuters and Norges Bank                                 
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TRADE TENSIONS ARE DAMPENING GROWTH
Since the beginning of 2018, a number of protectionist measures have been implemented globally. Most 
have been bilateral trade measures between China and the US. The average tariff level between these two 
countries has risen from around 5% in 2018 to just over 20% now. The measures have contributed to revers-
ing a long-run trend of trade liberalisation and lower global tariffs. This box examines the effects of trade 
tensions so far and how an escalation or de-escalation of these tensions could affect the economic outlook.
Trade tensions can influence economic developments through different channels. The direct effect of higher 
tariffs will depend on whether exporters adapt by raising prices or reducing margins. Lower margins will 
reduce profitability, while higher prices will raise costs for firms and consumers in the importing country and 
dampen demand. In both cases, growth in trade and investment is likely to slow. The effects can spread via 
value chains at home and abroad and hence to sectors and countries not directly affected by higher tariffs. 
Tariffs on cars in particular may have a wide-ranging impact. Expectations of further protectionist measures 
could also lead to uncertainty, which in itself could result in lower investment and negative effects in finan-
cial and commodity markets. Lower growth in global trade could also reduce growth in the longer term 
because of weaker competition and a decrease in technology transfer and specialisation across countries.
The effects of trade tensions are clearly visible in current statistics. In the course of the past year, trade 
between the US and China has fallen abruptly and contributed to the first decline in global trade in goods 
since the financial crisis (Chart 2.C). Indexes for trade policy uncertainty have risen to historically high levels 
(Chart 2.D), and investment growth for Norway’s main trading partners is now at its weakest in more than 
five years. In the US, prices have risen for a number of consumer goods now subject to tariffs. This reduces 
purchasing power and is likely to dampen consumption growth. The projections in the Monetary Policy 
Report for growth among Norway’s trading partners have been revised down several times since the begin-
ning of 2018. The projected level of trading partners’ GDP in 2020 is around 1% lower in this Report than in 
the March 2018 Report.
The effects of trade tensions on Norway’s trading partners are illustrated using a global DSGE model devel-
oped by the IMF.1 As the model encompasses five regions and includes bilateral trade flows and relative 
prices, it is well suited to exploring the effects of changes in tariff rates. In addition, the effects of heightened 
uncertainty on investment2 and the productivity effects of reduced international trade3 have been taken 
1 Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model (GIMF)
2 Estimates in Caldara et al. (2019) are used for the relationship between trade policy uncertainty and investment: Caldara, D., M. Iacoviello, P. Molligo, 
A. Prestipino, and A. Raffo (2019) ˝The Economic Effects of Trade Policy Uncertainty .˝ International Finance Discussion Papers 1256.
3 Estimates in ECB (2017) are used for the relationship between international value chain trade and productivity. The calculations assume a constant 
 relationship between trade and the use of global value chains. ECB Economic Bulletin, Issue 7/2017 ˝Does trade play a role in helping to explain 
 productivity growth?˝
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Chart 2.C Global trade in goods.1)                       
Twelve-month change. Percent. January 2005 – September 2019
1) The index for global trade in goods is an average of global imports and exports.
Sources: Thomson Reuters and Norges Bank                                                
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Chart 2.D Trade policy uncertainty.1) Index.2) January 2005 – November 2019
1) Indicator measuring the frequency of the word "uncertainty" connected to "trade policy" in news articles.
2) A positive slope denotes greater uncertainty.
Source: Caldara, D., M. Iacoviello, P. Molligo, A. Prestipino and A. Raffo, "The Economic Effects of
Trade Policy Uncertainty", revised November 2019, Journal of Monetary Economics, forthcoming.
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into account. It is assumed that the effects of uncertainty are greater in countries whose economic growth 
relies more heavily on foreign trade. It is also assumed that lower international trade has a greater impact 
on productivity in emerging economies than in advanced economies, in part because of less technology 
transfer.
The calculations indicate that trade tensions, through direct and indirect effects, have contributed to a GDP 
level among Norway’s trading partners that is now around ¾% lower than in a situation without protection-
ist measures. The calculations include all the changes in global tariffs between January 2018 and now and 
the increase in trade policy uncertainty in this period. For Norway’s main trading partners, the indirect 
effects of heightened uncertainty dominate, while for China and the US, the direct effects of higher tariffs 
are also substantial (Chart 2.E).
The projections in this Report are based on the assumption that no further trade policy measures will be 
implemented and that trade policy uncertainty gradually abates. Two alternative scenarios for develop-
ments ahead are explored. In scenario 1, it is assumed that the tensions escalate, with tariffs imposed on 
the remaining trade between the US and China and on cars and car parts imported to and exported from 
the US.4 In scenario 2, it is assumed that all punitive tariffs are reversed in 2020.
Chart 2.F shows the effects on trading partners’ GDP. In scenario 1, trading partners’ GDP could be almost 
1% lower in 2021, partly because the direct impact of higher tariffs will be greater for European countries if 
tariffs on cars and car parts are introduced. At the same time, uncertainty is likely to increase further, damp-
ening investment for an extended period ahead. On the other hand, if the measures already introduced are 
reversed and uncertainty quickly recedes, the calculations show that GDP could be around ¼% higher than 
currently projected. The positive consequences of reversing the protectionist measures thus appear to be 
considerably smaller than the negative effects of an escalation in trade tensions in line with scenario 1.
Effects on the Norwegian economy
As a small open economy, Norway is affected by trade tensions. At the same time, growth in the Norwegian 
economy has been solid in recent years in spite of weaker growth among trading partners. It is likely that 
the direct impact of trade tensions on the Norwegian economy has so far been limited.
4 Scenario 1 assumes that a 15% punitive tariff is imposed on imports to the US from China worth around USD 280bn and on imports to China from the US 
worth around USD 40bn. In addition, it is assumed that the US imposes a 20% tariff on imports of cars and car parts and that US trading partners 
respond with similar countermeasures.
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Chart 2.E Output gap for Norway's trading partners, the US and China.
Estimated effects of trade conflicts. Percentage points. 2019        
Source: Norges Bank
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Chart 2.F Output gap for Norway's trading partners. Estimated effects of trade
conflicts in different scenarios. Percentage points. 2019 – 2022             
Source: Norges Bank
Scenario 1: Escalation
Scenario 2: De-escalation
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The Norwegian economy is, however, not immune to negative impulses from abroad. An escalation in 
trade tensions in line with scenario 1 will most likely have a negative impact on the Norwegian economy. 
Lower growth among Norway’s trading partners will lead to lower demand for Norwegian exports. In addi-
tion, lower global growth could reduce the demand for oil, resulting in a lower oil price. Norway also has 
substantial exports related to the car industry. These include car parts, aluminium and ferro-alloys, which 
make up close to 10% of total mainland exports. There is therefore reason to believe that an increase in 
tariffs on cars and car parts imported from and exported to the US will have a stronger direct effect on the 
Norwegian economy than the measures introduced so far.
On the other hand, a de-escalation in line with scenario 2 would likely have a positive effect on the Norwe-
gian economy through higher growth among trading partners and a slightly higher oil price.
The potential effects of the scenarios on the Norwegian economy are illustrated using the Bank’s main 
macroeconomic model NEMO. Charts 2.G and 2.H show the effects of the scenarios on the output gap and 
the policy rate. It is important to emphasise that this is only a technical illustration. The effects of these 
scenarios on Norway’s trading partners and on the Norwegian economy are highly uncertain.
The escalation in trade tensions in scenario 1 leads to lower growth in traditional exports, via lower exter-
nal demand and direct effects of tariffs imposed on cars. At the same time, a lower oil price will lead to 
weaker developments in the oil service industry through lower offshore oil investment and lower exports. 
This results in weaker growth in the Norwegian economy, and the output gap will fall more rapidly than 
projected in this Report. A weaker krone because of a lower oil price will cushion the fall in exports. In the 
model, the central bank will react to the weaker outlook by lowering the policy rate. Prices for imported 
goods increase owing to a weaker krone, while lower capacity utilisation curbs wage growth and domestic 
inflation. Overall, inflation is approximately unchanged. Isolated effects of heightened uncertainty are not 
taken into account in the analysis of the Norwegian economy and could amplify the impact on the economy, 
for example through a decline in investment.
A de-escalation of trade tensions in line with scenario 2 could result in slightly higher growth, a stronger 
krone and slightly higher interest rates. The effects are less pronounced than the effects of an escalation 
of tensions, reflecting the likelihood that the direct effects of the protectionist measures introduced so far 
on the Norwegian economy are small and that the upside in international terms is also smaller.
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Chart 2.F Output gap for Norway's trading partners. Estimated effects of trade
conflicts in different scenarios. Percentage points. 2019 – 2022             
Source: Norges Bank
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Chart 2.G Output gap for Norway. Estimated effects in NEMO of trade conflicts in
different scenarios. Percentage points. 2019 – 2022                            
Source: Norges Bank
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Chart 2.H Policy rate. Estimated effects in NEMO of trade conflicts in
different scenarios. Percentage points. 2019 – 2022                  
Source: Norges Bank
Scenario 1: Escalation
Scenario 2: De-escalation
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The average residential mortgage rate has risen gradually over the past year, although less 
than the policy rate. The mortgage rate is projected to remain approximately unchanged in 
the years ahead and be 3.1% in 2022. The krone has depreciated considerably and is weaker 
than projected in September. The krone is expected to remain weak in the years ahead. 
Overall, financial conditions appear to be slightly more accommodative than expected in the 
September Monetary Policy Report.
3.1 LENDING RATES
Higher residential mortgage rate
The average residential mortgage rate was 2.9% at 
the end of October. Developments in interest rates 
offered by banks suggest that the residential mort-
gage rate will be just over 3.0% at the end of 2019. 
This is slightly lower than assumed in the September 
Report.
While the policy rate was raised by a total of 1.0 per-
centage point between September 2018 and Septem-
ber 2019, it appears that the total rise in the residen-
tial mortgage rate will be just over 0.6 percentage 
point at the end of 2019 (Chart 3.1). Developments in 
the mortgage rate reflect competitive conditions in 
the banking sector and banks’ total funding costs.
A number of banks report that there is strong com-
petition in the residential mortgage market. These 
conditions may have curbed the increase in mortgage 
rates. At the same time, banks report that deposit 
market competition is weaker, and bank deposit rates 
rose by less than the policy rate again in Q3. Lower 
costs in the deposit market may have provided leeway 
for banks to offer lower mortgage rates than implied 
by the policy rate.
The interest rate on banks’ wholesale funding has 
also increased by less than the policy rate in the past 
year. For wholesale funding, banks pay the money 
market rate Nibor plus a risk premium. The risk 
premium is little changed since the September 
Report, while three-month Nibor has risen.
3 Financial conditions
MONETARY POLICY SINCE SEPTEMBER
At the monetary policy meeting on 18 Septem-
ber, the policy rate was raised from 1.25% to 
1.50%. The analyses in the September Report 
indicated that the policy rate would remain close 
to this level ahead. With such a policy rate path, 
inflation was projected to remain close to the 
target, while unemployment would remain low.
At the monetary policy meeting on 23 October, 
new information was assessed against the pro-
jections in the September Report. The upturn in 
the Norwegian economy had continued approx-
imately as expected, and underlying inflation 
had been in line with projections. Growth pros-
pects for trading partners appeared to be slightly 
weaker than assumed. The krone had depreci-
ated markedly. The Executive Board’s assess-
ment was that the outlook for the policy rate for 
the period ahead was little changed since the 
September Report. Uncertainty about global 
developments had persisted, and foreign inter-
est rates were very low. At the same time, the 
depreciation of the krone could push up inflation 
ahead. The Executive Board decided to keep the 
policy rate unchanged at 1.50%.
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Three-month Nibor is determined by market expecta-
tions of the average policy rate over the next three 
months and by a risk premium, generally referred to 
as the money market premium. The money market 
premium, as calculated here, has risen slightly since 
the September Report. So far in Q4, the premium has 
averaged a good 0.3 percentage point. This is slightly 
lower than anticipated.
Bank lending rates for enterprises are often directly 
linked to Nibor and have risen slightly since the Sep-
tember Report. At the end of October, the average 
lending rate for enterprises was 3.9%. Large firms can 
also raise funds directly in the bond market. Corporate 
bond risk premiums have fallen so far in 2019 and have 
shown little change since September.
Residential mortgage rate at 3.1%
In the projections, the residential mortgage rate 
remains approximately unchanged in the coming 
years and is close to 3.1% in 2022. The projections are 
slightly lower than in the September Report.
The projections are lower because of a small down-
ward revision of the estimated money market 
premium in Nibor (Chart 3.2). This premium is 
expected to be close to 0.35 percentage point 
throughout the projection period, down from 0.4 
percentage point in the September Report. The 
premium is being revised down as the market is 
pricing in a slightly lower USD money market premium 
ahead and as the premium has for a period been lower 
than estimated in the Bank’s reports.
Norwegian forward money market rates are higher 
than in the September Report. Market-implied rates 
suggest that the policy rate in the years ahead will 
remain approximately at today’s level (Chart 3.3).
3.2 KRONE EXCHANGE RATE
Weaker-than-projected krone
The krone, as measured by the import-weighted 
exchange rate I-44, has depreciated by about 2% 
since the September Report (Chart 3.4). In the course 
of the period, the krone exchange rate has reached 
record-low levels, both against the euro and as meas-
ured by the I-44.
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Chart 3.1 Interest rates. Percent. 2013 Q1 – 2022 Q41)
1)
2022 Q4 (policy rate).  2) Average interest rate on outstanding mortgage loans to households from
the sample of banks included in Statistics Norway's monthly interest rate statistics. 3) Projections
are calculated as a two-quarter moving average of the policy rate plus the projected money market
premium. 
Sources: Statistics Norway, Thomson Reuters and Norges Bank 
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Chart 3.2 Norwegian three-month money market premium.1) Five-day moving
average. Percentage points. 1 January 2013 – 31 December 20222)       
1) Norges Bank estimates of the difference between the three-month money market rate and the expected
policy rate. 2) Projections for 2019 Q4 – 2022 Q4. 
Sources: Thomson Reuters and Norges Bank 
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Chart 3.3 Three-month money market rate 1) and estimated forward rates2).
Percent. 2013 Q1 – 2022 Q4 3)                                               
1) Projections for the money market rate are calculated as a two-quarter moving average of the
policy rate plus the projected money market premium. 2) Forward rates are based on money market
rates and interest rate swaps. The orange and blue bands show the highest and lowest rates in the
period 2 September –13 September in 2019 (MPR 3/19) and in the period 2 December – 13
December in 2019 (MPR 4/19), respectively. 3) Projections for 2019 Q4 – 2022 Q3 (money market
rate) / 2022 Q4 (forward rates). 
Sources: Thomson Reuters and Norges Bank 
Three-month money market rate, MPR 4/19
Three-month money market rate, MPR 3/19
Estimated forward rates, MPR 4/19
Estimated forward rates, MPR 3/19
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The krone is weaker than assumed in the September 
Report. Historically, there has been a close relation-
ship between the krone exchange rate and develop-
ments in the oil price and interest rate differentials 
between Norway and trading partners. The oil price 
is somewhat higher than at the time of the September 
Report and interest rate differentials have widened 
slightly. This would in isolation imply a stronger krone.
Persistent uncertainty about global developments 
may have contributed to a weaker krone over time 
than projected in the Bank’s reports. The uncertainty 
may have pushed up the risk premium on the Nor-
wegian krone and other currencies with limited liquid-
ity.1 There is still considerable uncertainty around 
international developments, even though the US and 
China have reached a limited trade agreement and 
there are prospects that the UK will exit the EU in the 
new year with a withdrawal agreement.
The deterioration in Norway’s terms of trade after the 
2014 oil price fall and the uncertainty around future 
activity levels in the oil sector have likely contributed 
to a persistently weak krone. There has been a rela-
tively close relationship over time between Norway’s 
terms of trade and the real exchange rate, defined as 
the relationship between domestic and foreign hourly 
labour costs measured in a common currency (Chart 
3.5). The 2014 oil price fall led to a marked deteriora-
tion in the terms of trade. The adjustment to weaker 
terms of trade may take the form of a weaker nominal 
exchange rate and lower relative wage growth. Both 
have been observed after the oil price fall in 2014. The 
developments in the terms of trade may suggest that 
the real krone exchange rate will not revert to the 
levels prevailing before the oil price fall.
The krone will remain weak ahead
The conditions that have had a weakening effect on 
the krone are expected to continue to weigh on the 
krone in the years ahead. However, the risk premium 
is expected to be somewhat lower. This implies a 
moderate appreciation of the krone in the year ahead 
(Chart 3.6). Interest rate differentials between Norway 
and trading partners are expected to remain close to 
today’s level in the projection period. The projections 
1 See Akram, Q.F. “Oil price drivers, geopolitical uncertainty and oil expor-
ters’ currencies”. Norges Bank Working Papers 15/2019. Norges Bank.
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Chart 3.4 Import-weighted exchange rate index (I-44).1)
3 December 2018 – 13 December 2019                       
1) A positive slope denotes a weaker krone exchange rate. 2) Projection for the average in 2019 Q4.
Sources: Thomson Reuters and Norges Bank                                                                     
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Chart 3.5 Relative hourly labour costs1) in the manufacturing sector and terms of
trade. Index. 2000 = 100. 2000 – 20192) 
1) Hourly labour costs in manufacturing in Norway relative to EU trading partners in a common currency.
2) Projections for 2019. 3) Terms of trade is defined as export prices divided by import prices. 
Sources: Norwegian Technical Calculation Committee for Wage Settlements (TBU), Statistics Norway and
Norges Bank 
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Chart 3.6 Import-weighted exchange rate index (I-44).1) Three-month 
money market rate differential between Norway2) and trading partners3). 
Percentage points. 2013 Q1 – 2022 Q44) 
1) A positive slope denotes a stronger krone exchange rate. 2) Projections for the money market rate 
are calculated as a two-quarter moving average of the policy rate plus the projected money market
premium. 3) Forward rates for trading partners at September 13 (MPR 3/19) and 13 December 2019
(MPR 4/19). See Norges Bank (2015) "Calculation of the aggregate for trading partner interest rates".
Norges Bank Papers 2/2015. 4) Projections for 2019 Q4 – 2022 Q3 (money market rate) / 2022 Q4
(I-44). 
Sources: Thomson Reuters and Norges Bank 
Three-month rate differential (l.h.s.)
I-44 (r.h.s.)
Projections MPR 4/19
Projections MPR 3/19
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for the krone exchange rate are lower than in the Sep-
tember Report throughout the projection period.
The projections for the krone are uncertain
The path of the krone exchange rate may differ from 
that projected in this Report. If global uncertainty 
diminishes, the krone may appreciate more rapidly 
than projected. On the other hand, the krone depre-
ciation may be more persistent than assumed, and 
the krone may remain weaker than projected.
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Chart 4.1 GDP for mainland Norway. Seasonally adjusted. Percent. 
Monthly growth and rolling three-month growth1). January 2018 – March 20202) 
1) Growth the past three-month period compared with the previous three-month period. 2) Projections for
December 2019 – March 2020. 3) System for Averaging short-term Models. 
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
Monthly growth
Rolling three-month growth
Projections MPR 4/19
Forecast from SAM3)
Since 2016, growth in the Norwegian economy has been solid. Employment has risen, and 
unemployment has fallen. Capacity utilisation now appears to be somewhat above a normal 
level, and inflation is close to the inflation target.
Mainland economic growth is now tapering off. In the period ahead, growth in investment is 
expected to slacken. There are prospects that capacity utilisation will gradually decline ahead. 
Following a rise in 2019, wage growth is expected to remain fairly steady in the coming years. 
Inflation is projected to be a little above 2% through the projection period.
4.1 OUTPUT AND DEMAND
Mainland economic growth is tapering off
Growth in the Norwegian economy has been solid 
since 2016. The global upturn, improved cost-com-
petitiveness and higher oil prices have helped lift 
activity, as have low interest rates.
Growth in the mainland economy continued into 2019 
Q3. National accounts figures show that mainland GDP 
increased by 0.7% from the previous quarter, driven 
by particularly strong growth in July. According to 
monthly national accounts figures for the period to 
October, mainland growth has slowed since July (Chart 
4.1). GDP growth has been slightly weaker than pro-
jected in the September 2019 Monetary Policy Report.
Norges Bank’s Regional Network contacts also report 
lower growth in activity through autumn. Growth has 
slowed in all sectors, but most in distributive trade 
and construction (Chart 4.2). Regional Network enter-
prises expect slightly slower growth ahead. Continued 
solid growth in services is supporting overall output 
growth.
Monthly national accounts figures indicate that 
growth has slowed between Q3 and Q4. In line with 
the expectations of Regional Network contacts, the 
slower pace of growth is expected to continue into 
2020. The projections are slightly lower than esti-
mates from Norges Bank’s System for Averaging 
short-term Models (SAM).
Prospects for lower growth ahead
Mainland GDP growth is projected at 2.5% in 2019. 
Mainland growth is projected to slow to 1.9% in 2020 
and 1.4% in 2021 and 2022 (Chart 1.9).
4 The Norwegian economy
REGIONAL NETWORK
Norges Bank has regular contact with a network 
of business leaders. The purpose is to gather 
information on economic developments in their 
businesses and industries. The network consists 
of around 1 500 enterprises, and each enterprise 
is contacted about once a year. Interviews are 
conducted each quarter and more than 300 
network contacts participate in each round.
The contacts represent enterprises in Norwe-
gian businesses and the local government and 
hospital sector that reflect the production side 
of the economy both sector-wise and geograph-
ically.
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The growth picture is affected by developments in petro-
leum investment. After falling sharply between 2013 and 
2017, petroleum investment picked up through 2018. In 
2019, growth in petroleum investment has been sub-
stantial (Chart 4.3). Looking ahead, several large invest-
ment projects on the Norwegian shelf will be completed. 
Petroleum investment is projected to grow more slowly 
in 2020, declining thereafter in 2021 and 2022 (see box 
on page 36). Growth in other business investment is also 
expected to slow into 2020, after having increased sub-
stantially over several years. Markedly lower investment 
growth further ahead will have a dampening effect on 
growth in the Norwegian economy.
On the other hand, a weaker krone is strengthening 
the economy, improving the cost-competitiveness of 
Norwegian companies. This may push up net exports 
and boost business investment. At the same time, a 
weaker krone implies an increase in prices for imported 
goods and services. This reduces household real dis-
posable income and may curb consumption growth.
In the projections, growth among trading partners is 
fairly moderate. Monetary policy in Norway has 
become gradually less expansionary in recent years. 
Fiscal policy is assumed to be slightly expansionary 
through the projection period (see box on page 35). 
The projections are based on the assumption that 
growth in transfers to households will pick up. At the 
same time, growth in public demand is expected to 
slow, after rising briskly in 2019. 
The overall projections for mainland GDP are little 
changed since the time of the September Report.
Close to zero growth in business investment
Mainland business investment has increased markedly 
since 2015 and has contributed to the upturn in the 
Norwegian economy. Business investment as a share 
of mainland GDP is now at a high level (Chart 4.4).
In 2019, manufacturing investment in particular has 
increased. According to Statistics Norway’s investment 
intentions survey, power and manufacturing investment 
will decline markedly in 2020, partly owing to the comple-
tion of large investment projects. As a result, investment 
growth is likely to slow ahead (Chart 4.5). Prospects for 
a sustained rise in investment in services and other 
goods production will keep investment growth elevated.
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Chart 4.3  Petroleum investment.1) Annual change. Percent. 2013 – 2022 2)
1) Working-day adjusted. 2) Projections for 2019 – 2022. 
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
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Chart 4.4 Mainland business investment.1) 
Share of GDP for mainland Norway. Percent. 1980 – 20222) 
1) Working-day adjusted. 2) Projections for 2019 – 2022. 
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
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Chart 4.2 Output growth by sector as reported by the Regional Network.
Annualised. Percent                                                   
Source: Norges Bank
August 2019 - Previous 3 months
November 2019 - Previous 3 months
November 2019 - Next 6 months
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Chart 4.5 Mainland business investment.1) 
Contribution to annual change.2) Percentage points. 2013 - 2020 3) 
1) Working-day adjusted. 2) Discrepancies occur in the statistics between the sum of the components and
aggregate business investment prior to base year 2017. 3) Projections for 2019 and 2020. 
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
Oil service industry
Manufacturing and mining
Other goods production
Other services
Power sector
Business investment
Investment measured as a share of mainland GDP is 
expected to decrease in the years ahead, but remain 
above its historical average. Capacity utilisation in the 
Norwegian economy appears to be somewhat above 
a normal level, which may contribute to keeping invest-
ment high. The krone depreciation is improving the 
profitability of export firms and may have the same effect.
Moderate growth in housing investment
Growth in housing investment is also expected to 
slow in the coming period. After a marked fall in house 
prices in the second half of 2017 pulled down invest-
ment for a period, housing investment has increased 
gradually since summer 2018. Recently, house price 
inflation has been moderate. Through autumn, the 
12-month rise in prices was between 2% and 4%.
Turnover in the market for existing homes have been 
high through 2019. At the same time, a large number 
of dwellings are nearing completion. Together with a 
higher residential mortgage lending rate, this will likely 
also contribute to moderate house price inflation in 
the coming years (Chart 4.6). Moderate house price 
developments and the large stock of unsold homes 
imply a slight decline in housing investment in the 
coming quarters. Housing investment growth is 
expected to hold steady thereafter, broadly in line with 
developments in real house prices. A further discus-
sion of the housing market is provided in Section 6.
Temporary factors dampen consumption growth
Following solid growth in recent years, growth in 
private consumption is lower in 2019, and lower than 
growth in real household disposable income (Chart 
4.7). Consumer confidence indicators are lower than 
in September and are now close to, but slightly below 
their historical averages (Chart 4.8). More households 
consider their finances to be tighter now than one 
year ago. Higher interest rates have contributed to 
slower consumption growth and a higher household 
saving ratio. The saving ratio is expected to continue 
to rise slightly in the near term (Chart 4.9).
A number of temporary factors are having a dampen-
ing effect on consumption growth in 2019 and 2020. 
New European emission standards for car manufac-
turers will likely lead to a postponement of electric 
vehicle deliveries from 2019 to 2020, which will 
restrain consumption growth in 2019. At the start of 
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Chart 4.6 Housing investment and nominal house prices. 
Annual change. Percent. 2013 – 2022 1) 
1) Projections for 2019 – 2022. 
Sources: Real Estate Norway, Eiendomsverdi, Finn.no, Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
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Chart 4.7 Household consumption1) and real disposable income2).3) 
Annual change. Percent. 2013 – 2022 4) 
1) Working-day adjusted. 2) Excluding dividend income. 3) Includes non-profit organisations. 
4) Projections for 2019 – 2022. 
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
Projections MPR 4/19
Projections MPR 3/19
Real disposable income
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2020, the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) 
licence fee will be replaced by tax financing. This 
entails a reclassification of NRK’s financing from 
private to public consumption in the national 
accounts. This dampens consumption, while produc-
ing a corresponding increase in public demand. At 
the same time, the reclassification implies higher 
taxes, which reduces disposable income. Consumer 
debt regulation and new credit registers have helped 
to restrain growth in consumer debt, which may also 
be dampening consumption growth somewhat.
Further out, wage and employment growth are pro-
jected to slow. Along with a weaker krone, this will 
entail a slowdown in growth in real disposable 
income. However, a slight increase in consumption 
growth is expected as the effects of the temporary 
factors dissipate. The projections imply a small 
decrease in the household saving ratio.
Surge in export growth in 2019
Growth in mainland exports has picked up over the past 
few years, and mainland exports have shown marked 
growth in 2019 (Chart 4.10). Some export firms in the 
Regional Network report noticing the effects of global 
trade tensions, but the weak krone has, at the same 
time, strengthened many exporters’ competitiveness. 
A weaker krone and higher demand from the global 
petroleum industry are contributing to the marked rise 
in exports in 2019, despite weaker growth among Nor-
way’s trading partners. Oil-related exports in particular 
have increased, but exports of other services and 
seafood have also shown some increase in 2019.
In 2020, export growth is expected to slow, largely 
owing to weaker impulses from the global petroleum 
industry. Further out in the projection period, export 
growth is expected to pick up slightly in pace with a 
pick-up in growth among Norway’s trading partners.
Imports have also increased markedly in 2019, reflecting 
the upswing in oil investment but also strong growth in 
other business investment and exports. Prospects that 
investment growth will abate imply lower import growth 
ahead. In isolation, a weaker krone has a dampening 
impact on demand for foreign goods and services. 
However, the impact is assumed to be relatively modest.1
1 See Naug, B. and E. Nordbø (2018) “How much of a tailwind have we had 
from the weaker krone?”. Staff Memo 6/2019. Norges Bank.
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Chart 4.8 Consumer confidence. Net values. Kantar TNS trend indicator for
households. 2013 Q1 – 2019 Q4. Opinion consumer confidence index (CCI). 
January 2013 – November 2019                                            
Trend indicator (left-hand scale)
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Chart 4.10 Exports from mainland Norway.1) 
Annual change. Percent. 2013 – 2022 2) 
1) Working-day adjusted. 2) Projections for 2019 – 2022. 3) Groups of goods and services in the national
accounts where the oil service industry accounts for a considerable share of exports. 
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
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Chart 4.9 Household saving and net lending. 
Share of disposable income. Percent. 1996 – 20221) 
1) Projections for 2019 – 2022.     
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank
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The projections are uncertain
Growth in the Norwegian economy is projected to 
slow into 2020, but the extent of the slowdown is 
uncertain. If investment activity remains elevated 
longer, the upturn may continue for longer than envis-
aged. On the other hand, persistent global uncer-
tainty may lead to lower growth among Norway’s 
trading partners than projected in this Report, which 
could have a dampening effect on export growth. If 
global trade tensions escalate, growth in the Norwe-
gian economy may prove lower than projected. See 
box on page 17 for a further discussion of conse-
quences of different outcomes of the ongoing trade 
tensions for global and domestic growth.
4.2 LABOUR MARKET AND OUTPUT GAP
Employment growth has slowed
Employment growth has been high since 2016. Growth 
continued in 2019 Q3, but at a more moderate pace 
than in the preceding quarters and was somewhat 
weaker than projected in the September Report. Since 
2018 Q3, the number of employed has risen by 47 000. 
Of these, 8 000 are non-resident workers in Norway.
Employment growth has slowed in most industries. 
Business services is among the industries where 
growth has slowed the most (Chart 4.11). In distribu-
tive trade, developments in employment have been 
weak for several years and in 2019 Q3, the number of 
employed declined. On the other hand, employment 
growth has picked up further in oil-related industries.
The job vacancy rate has fallen since the September 
Report (Chart 4.12). Norges Bank’s Regional Network 
expects employment growth to slow further into 
2020. Contacts have also revised down their employ-
ment growth expectations (Chart 4.13). The expecta-
tions survey suggests that employment growth will 
not slow ahead.
Unemployment declined between the beginning of 
2016 and spring 2019 (Chart 4.14), and has since shown 
little change. In November, registered unemployment 
was 2.2%, in line with projections. The share receiving 
unemployment benefits has also recently remained 
stable. The Labour Force Survey (LFS) shows that 
unemployment has increased since the September 
Report, reaching 3.9% in September. The LFS is a 
sample survey and there is considerable uncertainty 
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Chart 4.11 Employed persons. Wage earners and self-employed. 
Seasonally adjusted. Index. 2013 Q1 = 100. 2013 Q1 - 2019 Q3 
Sources: Statistic Norway and Norges Bank
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Chart 4.12 Job vacancies. Share of the total number of jobs. 
Seasonally adjusted. Percent. 2013 Q1 – 2019 Q3 
Source: Statistics Norway
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Chart 4.13 Expected employment. Regional Network.1) Quarterly change. 
Seasonally adjusted. Percent. Norges Bank's Expectations Survey. 
Diffusion index.2) 2013 Q1 – 2019 Q4 
1) Expected change in employment next three months. 2) Share of business leaders expecting "more
employees" in their own firm in the following 12 months + 0.5 * share expecting "unchanged number of
employees". 
Sources: Epinion, Opinion and Norges Bank 
Regional Network (l.h.s.)
Expectations Survey (r.h.s.)
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associated with month-to-month changes. However, 
viewed over a somewhat longer period, the LFS con-
firms the impression that unemployment may have 
bottomed out in the current business cycle.
Prospects that unemployment will remain low
Employment growth will normally follow GDP growth 
with a slight lag. The GDP projections imply that 
employment will continue to rise, but that employ-
ment growth will slow through the projection period. 
The number of employed is projected to increase by 
just over 40 000 between year-end 2019 and year-end 
2022. Unemployment is expected to show little 
change ahead (Chart 1.10).
The economy is near a cyclical peak
Since 2016, there has been an upturn in the Norwegian 
economy and spare capacity has steadily diminished. 
The Bank’s assessment is that capacity utilisation 
reached a normal level at year-end 2018 and increased 
further in the first half of 2019 (Chart 1.1b). In the Sep-
tember Report, capacity utilisation was projected to 
pick up further through 2019 Q3 and 2019 Q4.
According to Regional Network contacts, overall capac-
ity utilisation has shown little change since spring (Chart 
4.15 and Table 4.1). The share reporting labour short-
ages has increased slightly since the September Report, 
but the indicator remains close to its historical average. 
The number of employed persons as a share of the 
population, ie the employment rate, has picked up 
further (Chart 4.16). Adjusted for the effect of an ageing 
labour force, the employment rate is now appreciably 
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Chart 4.14 Registered fully unemployment and unemployment benefit
recipients1). Share of labour force. Seasonally adjusted. Percent. 
January 2007 – March 2020 2) 
1) Approximately half of the fully unemployed receive unemployment benefits. Some partly
unemployed persons and labour market programme participants are also eligible for unemployment
benefits. 2) Projections for December 2019 - March 2020. 
Sources: Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV) and Norges Bank 
Fully unemployed
Recipients of unemployment benefits
Table 4.1 Capacity utilisation indicators1
Indicator type Low Close to normal High
Employment and 
 unemployment Unemployment (LFS)
Registered unemployment (NAV) QNA employment (2013 trend)2
Employment, 25–54 (LFS) Labour force (LFS, 2013 trend)2
Prices and wages Wage growth Domestic inflation3
Business surveys
Labour supply (RN)4
Capacity utilisation (RN)4
Capacity utilisation (SSB)5
Other Job vacancies (SSB) New job seekers (NAV)
1 The indicators are placed in columns according to whether they signal low, close to normal or high capacity utilisation. The colour indicates the change since the 
June Report. Red indicates lower capacity utilisation. Green indicates higher capacity utilisation.
2 Labour force and employment developments if the share for each five-year age cohort had been unchanged from 2013 levels.
3 Domestically produced goods and services in the CPI-ATE.
4 Regional Network.
5 Statistics Norway’s business sentiment survey for manufacturing and mining and quarrying.
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Chart 4.15 Capacity utilisation1) and labour supply constraints2) as reported 
by the Regional Network. Percent. January 2005 – November 2019 
1) Share of contacts that will have some or considerable problems accommodating an increase in
demand. 2) Share of contacts reporting that output is being constrained by labour supply. Only
enterprises reporting full capacity utilisation are asked about labour supply, but the series shows the
share of all the contacts in the interview round. The local government and hospital sector does not
respond to the question about capacity utilisation but still responds to the question about labour supply. 
Source: Norges Bank 
Capacity utilisation
Labour supply constraints
Average 2005 – 2019
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higher than in 2013, when capacity utilisation was con-
sidered by the Bank to be close to a normal level.
A weighted average of labour market indicators sug-
gests that capacity utilisation increased between 2019 
Q2 and 2019 Q3 and is now slightly above a normal 
level (Chart 4.17). On the other hand, a model estima-
tion that also takes into account developments in 
other parts of the economy suggests that capacity 
utilisation has shown little change and remains close 
to a normal level.
Overall, capacity utilisation is assessed as having 
increased slightly since September, albeit less than 
expected. Capacity utilisation is estimated to have 
increased further between 2019 Q3 and 2019 Q4, and 
the economy is estimated to have reached a cyclical 
peak in 2019 Q4. From 2020, capacity utilisation is pro-
jected to fall gradually towards a normal level. For 
capacity utilisation, the projections for the next few 
years are a little lower than in the September Report 
and little changed towards the end of the projection 
period. Employment remains high throughout the pro-
jection period, ie close to or above what is now con-
sidered potential employment (see box on page 37).
Trend productivity growth has declined over time
Potential output is projected to grow by just over 1½% 
annually from 2020 to the end of the projection 
period. The projection is based on trend productivity 
growth of just under 1% and growth in potential 
employment of around ¾% on average.
The estimate for trend productivity growth is based on 
developments in actual productivity. However, produc-
tivity growth will vary through the business cycle. An 
indicator of trend productivity growth may therefore 
be the average productivity growth of an entire busi-
ness cycle. During the most recently ended business 
cycle, annual mainland productivity growth had been 
just under 1% (Chart 4.18). This is a little higher than in 
the previous cycle, which included the financial crisis, 
but substantially lower than in the preceding cycle. The 
lower productivity growth in the two most recent busi-
ness cycles reflects declines in most industries.
Trend employment growth is estimated based on 
Statistics Norway’s demographic projections. Lower 
immigration and an ageing population have pulled 
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Chart 4.16 Employed as a share of population aged 15 – 74. 
Residents. Percent. 2007 Q1 - 2019 Q3 
1) Employment (QNA) minus non-resident workers (register data). The series for non-resident workers
has been adjusted back in time owing to breaks in the series in 2015. 2) Employment share if the
employment share for each five-year age cohort had remained unchanged at 2013-levels. The curve
slopes downward owing to ageing of the population aged 15-74. The year 2013 was selected because
capacity utilisation was, in Norges Bank's opinion, close to a normal level in that year. 
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
Employment share1)
Ageing effect2)
OUTPUT GAP
The output gap, also referred to as capacity uti-
lisation, captures resource utilisation in the 
economy. The output gap is defined as the dif-
ference between actual output (GDP) and poten-
tial output. Potential output is the highest pos-
sible level of output that is consistent with stable 
price and wage inflation. Over time, potential 
output growth is determined by trend employ-
ment growth and productivity.
The output gap is a key monetary policy varia-
ble. In interest rate setting, weight is given to 
smoothing fluctuations in output and employ-
ment. To achieve this, the aim is to keep the 
output gap close to zero. This is referred to as 
normal capacity utilisation.
If we attempt to keep output and employment 
above that level, wage and price inflation could 
become too high. The output gap is therefore 
also an important indicator of future inflation 
and is related to Norges Bank’s objective of low 
and stable inflation.
Potential output and the output gap cannot be 
observed and must be estimated. Norges Bank’s 
current output gap estimates are the result of 
an overall assessment of a number of indicators 
and models. In this assessment, particular 
weight is given to labour market developments.
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down potential employment in recent years. The pro-
jections imply labour immigration will increase slightly 
through the projection period. At the same time, the 
Bank expects the number of non-resident workers to 
continue to increase.
Uncertainty regarding trend productivity growth
There is uncertainty regarding trend productivity 
growth. Actual productivity will normally increase 
more than trend productivity at the beginning of a 
cyclical upturn. Firms’ spare capacity will be better 
utilised when demand increases. Since the cyclical 
upturn started in the middle of 2016, productivity 
growth has averaged below 1%, which may indicate 
lower-than-assumed trend growth. On the other 
hand, high business investment, new technology and 
increasing digitalisation may lead to higher productiv-
ity ahead, even if it may take time before the effect 
shows up in reported data.
4.3 COSTS AND PRICES
Inflation has remained close to target
Inflation increased markedly through 2018 and was 
for a period above 3%. This was due in part to a sub-
stantial rise in electricity prices, but rising wage 
growth and higher capacity utilisation also pushed 
up domestic inflation. At the same time, prices for 
imported goods rose (Chart 4.19).
Inflation has slowed in 2019. In November, the 
12-month rise in the consumer price index (CPI) was 
1.6%. The consumer price index adjusted for tax 
changes and excluding energy products (CPI-ATE) 
increased by 2.0%. Other indicators of underlying infla-
tion showed a 12-month rise of between 1.7% and 2.3% 
in November (see box on page 34). Since the Septem-
ber Report, inflation has overall shown little change.
Long-term inflation expectations fell slightly between 
2019 Q3 and 2019 Q4 but remain slightly above the 
inflation target (see box on page 34).
Since the September Report, the 12-month rise in the 
CPI-ATE has been as projected. The rise in prices for 
imported consumer goods has been slightly lower 
than expected, while the rise in prices for domestically 
produced goods and services has been broadly in line 
with projections. Energy price inflation has slowed 
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Chart 4.19 Imported consumer goods in the CPI-ATE1) and international
inflationary impulses in NOK2). Four-quarter change. 1996 Q1 – 2020 Q1 3)
1) CPI adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy products. 2) Norges Bank's indicator of
international inflationary impulses to imported consumer goods in NOK. 3) Projections for 2019 Q4 –
2020 Q1. 4) Simple average for the past eight quarters. 
Sources: Statistics Norway, Thomson Reuters and Norges Bank 
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Chart 4.18 Productivity growth in different sectors. 
Average annual growth in different periods. 1998 Q3 – 2019 Q3 
1) Manufacturing and other goods production. 
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
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Chart 4.17 Output gap estimates.1) Percent. 2009 Q1 – 2019 Q3
1) The output gap measures the percentage difference between mainland GDP and estimated potential
mainland GDP. 
Source: Norges Bank 
Norges Bank's estimate
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Chart 4.20 Wages, wage norm and wage expectations.
Annual change. Percent. 2005 – 2020              
1) Actual annual wage growth from Statistics Norway. Norges Bank's projections for 2019 and 2020.
2) Social partners' wage growth expectations for the current year as measured by Norges Bank's
Expectations Survey in Q4 each year and expected annual wage growth for 2020 measured in 2019
Q4. 3) Expected wage growth for the current year as reported by the Regional Network in Q4 each
year and expected annual wage growth in 2020 measured in November 2019. 4) Before 2014: For
manufacturing as projected by the National Mediator or NHO. From 2014: For the overall industry,
based on an assessment by NHO, done in cooperation with LO. 
Sources: Epinion, Kantar TNS, LO, NHO, Opinion, Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
Annual wage growth1)
Expectations Survey2)
Regional Network3)
Wage norm4)
less than expected. Overall, 12-month CPI inflation 
has been slightly higher than projected.
Fairly stable wage growth ahead
Tighter labour market conditions in recent years have 
contributed to an increase in wage growth, which is 
expected to rise further to 3.4% in 2019 (Chart 4.20), 
in line with developments in current statistics. The 
projection is a little higher than the wage norm in this 
year’s wage settlement and is also slightly above the 
expectations in Norges Bank’s expectations survey 
and among Regional Network contacts. Solid employ-
ment growth in high-wage industries (Chart 4.11) is 
giving a boost to overall wage growth in 2019.
The expectations survey shows that the social part-
ners’ wage expectations for 2020 have been at a little 
above 3% in recent quarters, despite a tighter labour 
market and the krone depreciation. This may indicate 
that wage growth may turn out to be a little lower 
than previously assumed. Wage growth in 2020 is 
projected at 3.2 %, in line with the expectations in 
the expectations survey and among Regional 
Network contacts.
Wage growth is expected to remain fairly stable 
further out in the projection period. Profitability in 
manufacturing is lower than its historical average 
(Chart 4.21), reflecting the low profitability persisting 
in some manufacturing industries. In isolation, this 
implies lower wage growth. Capacity utilisation above 
a normal level suggests the opposite.
The projections imply that wage growth will remain 
low compared with previous upturns, which must be 
viewed in the context of the decline in productivity 
growth (Chart 4.22). According to Norges Bank’s 
expectations survey, long-term wage expectations 
are now around 3% (Chart 4.23). This is lower than 
the expectations in the early 2000s. The deterioration 
in the terms of trade after the oil price fall in 2014 and 
uncertainty surrounding the future activity level in 
the oil sector may have contributed to the decline in 
wage expectations.
The wage projection for 2019 is a little higher than in 
the September Report. The projections for the years 
ahead have been revised down compared with the 
September Report, despite prospects that inflation 
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Chart 4.21 Operating profit in manufacturing. Percent.1) 1980 – 2018
1) Operating profit in manufacturing as a share of factor income. 
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
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Chart 4.22 Wages and nominal productivity1).                     
Annual change. Three-year moving average. Percent. 1996 – 20192)
1) Nominal Mainland GDP per hour worked. 2) Projections for 2019. 
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
Wages
Nominal productivity
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may prove to be slightly higher. This is because it 
appears that capacity utilisation will turn out lower 
than projected earlier and that wage expectations 
have not risen as expected.
Higher imported inflation owing to a weaker krone
Underlying inflation is projected to remain close to 
2% in the coming months. The projections are slightly 
higher than the SAM-based projections (Chart 4.23) 
and imply annual CPI-ATE inflation of 2.3% in 2019. 
The annual projection is unchanged from September.
Inflation is expected to move up somewhat through 
2020 as the depreciation of the krone feeds through 
to import prices. Weaker external price impulses will 
have a dampening effect on the rise. Further out, 
imported inflation is expected to slow as the effects 
of the krone depreciation unwind. At the same time, 
above-normal capacity utilisation levels and contin-
ued growth in unit labour costs will contribute to 
underpinning domestic inflation. CPI-ATE inflation is 
projected overall to remain a little above 2% in the 
coming years.
Inflation projections for the coming years are slightly 
higher than in the September Report (Chart 4.25), 
primarily reflecting prospects for a weaker krone than 
previously assumed. Prospects for lower wage growth 
and lower capacity utilisation than projected earlier 
in isolation pull down the inflation projections.
Overall, the projections for CPI inflation and wage 
growth are consistent with a rise in real wage growth 
in 2019, with little change in growth thereafter. The 
projections imply that real wage growth further out 
in the projection period will be in line with productiv-
ity growth.
The projections are uncertain
Price and wage inflation ahead is uncertain. The 
expected rise in imported goods inflation owing to a 
weaker krone may lead to higher wage growth than 
anticipated. This may in turn lead to higher inflation. 
In the light of the relatively substantial depreciation 
of the krone, there is also a risk that the rise in prices 
will occur somewhat more rapidly than assumed. On 
the other hand, business sector profitability may 
prove weaker than projected. Price and wage inflation 
may then turn out to be lower than projected.
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
0
1
2
3
4
5
0
1
2
3
4
5
Chart 4.25 Domestically produced goods and services and imported consumer 
goods in CPI-ATE1). Four-quarter change. Percent. 2013 Q1 – 2022 Q42) 
1) CPI adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy products. 2) Projections for 2019 Q4 – 2022 Q4.
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
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Chart 4.24 CPI-ATE1) with fan chart2) from SAM 3).
Four-quarter change. Percent. 2016 Q1 – 2020 Q14)      
1) CPI adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy products. 2) The fan chart illustrates the
uncertainty in the projections. 3) System for Averaging short-term Models. 4) Projections for 
2019 Q4 – 2020 Q1. 
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
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Chart 4.23 Expected annual wage growth five years ahead. 
Percent. 2002 Q1 – 2019 Q4 
Sources: Epinion, Kantar TNS and Opinion
Employee organisations
Employer organisations
Economists, academia
Economists, financial industry
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INDICATORS OF UNDERLYING INFLATION
Inflation targeting should be forward-looking and flexible. Norges Bank sets the policy rate with a view to 
stabilising annual consumer price inflation (CPI) in the medium term. Temporary conditions can lead to 
substantial short-term fluctuations in CPI inflation. Indicators of underlying inflation can be useful in order 
to see through such fluctuations.1
The most important indicator of underlying inflation 
in Norges Bank’s analyses is the CPI adjusted for tax 
changes and excluding energy products (CPI-ATE), 
but supplementing this index with other indicators 
may be useful. The 12-month rise in other indicators 
the Bank looks at ranged between 1.7% and 2.3% 
in November (Chart 4.A). The 12-month average rise 
in these indicators was 2.0%. The underlying infla-
tion indicators showed a clear increase in the period 
to March 2019, but have since edged down.
1 See Husabø, E. (2017) “Indicators of underlying inflation in Norway”. 
Staff Memo 13/2017, Norges Bank, for a more detailed review of 
various indicators.
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Chart 4.A CPI and indicators of underlying inflation.      
Twelve-month change. Percent. January 2005 – November 2019
1) The CPI adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy products.  2) Median of the CPIM, CPIXE,
20% trimmed mean, weighted median, CPI-XV and CPI common. 3) The band shows the highest and
lowest values for the CPIM, CPIXE, 20% trimmed mean, weighted median, CPI-XV and CPI common. 
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
CPI Indicators3)
CPI-ATE1) Inflation target
Median2)
INFLATION EXPECTATIONS
Expectations of future inflation have a bearing on many economic decisions, such as price setting and wage 
formation. Inflation expectations are often referred to as anchored when medium- and long-term inflation 
expectations show little response to new information and remain at a level close to the inflation target. 
Anchored inflation expectations can make it easier for monetary policy to achieve the objective of price 
stability and contribute to smoothing fluctuations in output and employment.
In recent years, longer-term inflation expectations, 
as measured in Norges Bank’s expectations survey, 
have overall remained close to 2.5% (Chart 4.B).1 
The inflation target for monetary policy was 
lowered from 2.5% to 2.0% in March 2018. In the 
monetary policy reports published after the revi-
sion of the inflation target, it is assumed that it will 
take some time for inflation expectations to adjust 
to the new target. The expectations survey for 2019 
Q42 showed that long-term inflation expectations 
have declined slightly overall from Q3, but are still 
somewhat above target. In recent quarters, econ-
omists’ inflation expectations have declined 
towards 2%, while the social partners’ expectations 
have remained close to 2.5%.
1 See Erlandsen, S.K. and P.B. Ulvedal (2017) “Are inflation expectations anchored in Norway?”. Staff Memo 12/2017. Norges Bank, for a more detailed 
review.
2 The expectations survey was conducted in the period between 28 October and 15 November 2019. For business leaders, the survey was conducted in 
the period between 28 October and 22 November 2019.
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Chart 4.B Expected twelve-month change in CPI five years ahead.
Percent. 2005 Q1 – 2019 Q4                                    
Sources: Epinion, Kantar TNS and Opinion
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Economists, academia
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Chart 4.C Structural non-oil deficit and 3% of the GPFG1). Share of trend GDP
for mainland Norway. Percent. 2013 – 20222) 
1) Government Pension Fund Global. 2) Projections for 2019 – 2022.
Sources: Ministry of Finance and Norges Bank                                 
Structural non-oil deficit MPR 4/19
Structural non-oil deficit MPR 3/19
Three percent of GPFG
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Chart 4.A CPI and indicators of underlying inflation.      
Twelve-month change. Percent. January 2005 – November 2019
1) The CPI adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy products.  2) Median of the CPIM, CPIXE,
20% trimmed mean, weighted median, CPI-XV and CPI common. 3) The band shows the highest and
lowest values for the CPIM, CPIXE, 20% trimmed mean, weighted median, CPI-XV and CPI common. 
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
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Chart 4.B Expected twelve-month change in CPI five years ahead.
Percent. 2005 Q1 – 2019 Q4                                    
Sources: Epinion, Kantar TNS and Opinion
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Chart 4.C Structural non-oil deficit and 3% of the GPFG1). Share of trend GDP
for mainland Norway. Percent. 2013 – 20222) 
1) Government Pension Fund Global. 2) Projections for 2019 – 2022.
Sources: Ministry of Finance and Norges Bank                                 
Structural non-oil deficit MPR 4/19
Structural non-oil deficit MPR 3/19
Three percent of GPFG
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Chart 4.D Public sector demand1). Annual change. Percent. 2013 – 20222)
1) Working-day adjusted. 2) Projections for 2019 – 2022.
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank                         
Projections MPR 4/19
Projections MPR 3/19
ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNING FISCAL POLICY
The fiscal policy assumptions in this Report are based on the central government budgets for 2019 and 
2020 and other publicly available information. Petroleum revenue spending, as measured by the structural 
non-oil deficit, is estimated at 7.6% of trend mainland GDP in 2019 and 2020. The structural deficit has been 
revised down for both years compared with the September Report, but the projected deficits in 2021 and 
2022 are unchanged (Chart 4.C). Substantial revenues from the sale of emission permits reduce the struc-
tural deficit in 2019 and 2020, but a noticeable decline in these revenues is expected from 2021.1
Petroleum revenue spending in 2019 is projected to be equivalent to 2.8% of the value of the Government 
Pension Fund Global (GPFG) at the beginning of 2019. This percentage appears to decline through the 
remainder of the projection period as the value of the GPFG has increased substantially since the beginning 
of the year.
Since 2013, public sector demand has increased by 2%-3% annually (Chart 4.D). The most recent national 
accounts figures suggest that the relatively strong growth in public sector demand will continue in 2019. 
Growth is set to become markedly higher than assumed in both the September Report and the National 
Budget for 2020. The projections ahead are based on the assumption that growth in public sector demand 
will decelerate sharply. The projections are for all intents broadly unchanged from the September Report. 
The upward revision for 2020 is due to the reclassification of services provided by the Norwegian Broad-
casting Corporation (NRK) from the new year as public consumption in the national accounts. This reflects 
the replacement of the NRK licence fee by tax financing. The projection for private consumption has been 
revised down correspondingly.
Transfers to households are assumed to be consistent with the multi-year projections in the budget, imply-
ing faster growth in transfers. Direct and indirect taxes in real terms are assumed to remain unchanged as 
from 2020.
1 Lower revenues from emission permit sales could alone contribute to increasing the structural deficit by 0.2 percentage point, measured as a share of 
GDP, between 2020 and 2021. Since permit sales take place in the European market and have little bearing on economic activity in Norway, they have 
been included as an addition to the normal technical assumption of a 0.1 percentage point increase in the deficit in years for which a budget is not yet 
available. In 2021, the total deficit thus increases by 0.3 percentage point. The increase in 2022 is 0.1 percentage point, as assumed in the September 
Report.
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Chart 4.E Petroleum investment.1) 
Constant 2019 prices. In billions of NOK. 2013 – 20222) 
1)
the price index for petroleum investment in the national accounts. The price index is projected to rise by
3% in 2019 and 2% in 2020. 2) Projections for 2019 – 2022. 
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank   
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Chart 4.F Investment in field development and fields in production.1) 
Constant 2019 prices. In billions of NOK. 2013 – 20222) 
1) Figures for 2013 – 2018 are from Statistics Norway's investment intentions survey and are deflated by
the price index for petroleum investment in the national accounts. The price index is projected to rise by
3% in 2019 and 2% in 2020. 2) Projections for 2019 – 2022. 
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
Fields in production excluding new development projects
Development projects initiated before 14 December 2019
Balder X, Hod redevelopment, Grand, Lavrans, Grevling and Halten East South
Wisting, Alta-Gohta and the Noaka area
Snøhvit Future, Ormen Lange phase 3 and other new development projects
PROJECTIONS FOR PETROLEUM INVESTMENT
After falling markedly between 2013 and 2017, petroleum investment has shown a solid rise over the past 
two years (Chart 4.E). This primarily reflects substantial cost-cutting measures by oil companies, the pro-
nounced rise in oil prices since the beginning of 2016 and the large discoveries made at the beginning of 
the 2010s. As a result of the cost cuts, break-even prices for new development projects are now USD 10–35 
per barrel of oil, which is far lower than the long-term oil prices expected by oil companies. Oil companies 
have therefore started a number of development projects in new and existing fields since 2016. If oil and 
gas price developments are approximately as projected, oil companies are expected to launch more devel-
opment projects during the projection period (see box on page 16).
Investment in ongoing development projects will increase by well above 20% in 2019, falling somewhat 
thereafter in 2020 and markedly in 2021 and 2022 as development projects are completed. This decrease 
will be partially offset by new development projects scheduled to start ahead (Chart 4.F). However, most 
of these new projects are small compared with ongoing projects,1 as there have been few large discoveries 
in recent years. Investment in development projects is therefore projected to fall appreciably after 2020.
Other petroleum investment is projected to increase noticeably in 2019 and 2020, in line with the invest-
ment intentions survey for Q4, and then increase somewhat over the next two years. Investment in fields 
in production increased substantially in 2019, while increased investment in exploration, and shutdown and 
removal are the main contributors to projected growth in 2020.
Overall petroleum investment is projected to increase by 14.5% in 2019 and by 4.5% in 2020, before falling 
by 5% in 2021 and 4% in 2022. The projection for the level of investment in 2020 has been revised up by 
2% since September, primarily owing to new cost projections for two of the ongoing development projects 
(Njord and Martin Linge). The projections for 2021 and 2022 are also slightly higher than in the September 
Report. The projections for exploration and fields in production have been revised up because oil price 
projections are somewhat higher than in September. At the same time, projections for development projects 
in 2021 and 2022 have been revised down in the light of new information on coming development projects. 
The Fogelberg development project is expected to be cancelled and the Brasse and Noaka area develop-
ment projects will commence later than projected in September.
1 Development of the Wisting, Alta-Gohta and Noaka fields may bring investment to a total of over NOK 100bn in the period between 2021 and 2026. The 
Wisting field development is expected to commence towards the end of 2021, and Alta-Gohta and Noaka towards the end of 2022.
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HIGH EMPLOYMENT
In its conduct of monetary policy, Norges Bank’s primary task is securing low and stable inflation. At the 
same time, monetary policy is to contribute to high and stable output and employment and to counteract-
ing the build-up of financial imbalances.
The level of employment depends on a number of conditions on both the supply and the demand side of the 
economy. The labour supply will change over time, partly owing to demographic changes. Underlying devel-
opments in the labour supply are also affected by the tax system, welfare programmes, wage formation and 
other structural factors. For example, changes in the pension system since 2011 may have contributed to an 
increase in the underlying trend for labour supply, because more people remain employed for longer.
At the same time, both the supply and demand for labour will vary according to the business cycle. During 
downturns, when demand for labour is low and job prospects are poor, the labour supply will be lower than 
the underlying trend. For example, youths may choose to continue their education rather than seek work. 
Conversely, the labour supply will periodically be higher than the underlying trend when labour demand is 
high and job prospects are favourable.
Over time, employment is limited by the underlying labour supply trend. At the same time, there will always 
be some unemployment in the economy. This partly reflects the fact that there will always be some people 
who are temporarily between jobs, and that employers’ needs do not fully match the qualifications and 
wage expectations of those seeking work. In the literature, this is referred to as natural unemployment or 
equilibrium unemployment. This unemployment may change over time in response to structural changes 
in the labour market. Equilibrium unemployment subtracted from the underlying labour supply trend can 
be referred to as potential employment, ie the level of employment sustainable over time. If employment 
remains above potential, pressures normally emerge that accelerate wage growth and bring inflation above 
target.
The objective of high and stable employment is interpreted to mean that labour demand should be stabi-
lised around potential employment. That is, the aim is to stabilise employment at close to the highest level 
compatible with price stability over time. Attempting to raise employment above this level through sys-
tematically expansionary monetary policy entails a risk of accelerating price and wage inflation and a build-
up of financial imbalances.
Monetary policy cannot influence potential employment directly, but when other policy areas contribute 
to increasing the potential, monetary policy may contribute to a pick-up in labour demand. By helping to 
sustain employment in a downturn, monetary policy can also counteract what are called hysteresis effects, 
where unemployment becomes entrenched at high levels or employees permanently exit the labour market, 
implying a reduction in potential employment.
It is not possible to measure precisely the level of potential employment. There is normally a close correla-
tion between the gap between employment and potential employment on the one hand, and overall 
capacity utilisation in the economy on the other. When capacity utilisation is estimated to be above a normal 
level, employment is usually also assessed as above potential. When capacity utilisation is estimated to 
be below a normal level, employment appears able to increase without the risk of accelerating price and 
wage inflation.
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5.1 OBJECTIVES AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Low and stable inflation
The primary objective of monetary policy is low and 
stable inflation. When the inflation target was intro-
duced in 2001, the operational target of monetary 
policy was annual consumer price inflation of 2.5%. 
In March 2018, the target was changed to 2%. Average 
annual consumer price inflation has been around 2% 
since 2001 (Chart 5.1).
Inflation targeting shall be forward-looking and flex-
ible so that it can contribute to high and stable output 
and employment and to countering the build-up of 
financial imbalances. Over the past decade, output 
and employment volatility has been relatively limited 
despite large shocks to the Norwegian economy. A 
flexible inflation-targeting regime has helped to 
dampen the impact on the real economy. Monetary 
policy objectives and trade-offs are described further 
in a box on page 43.
Monetary policy has become less expansionary
The interest rate level in recent years has been histori-
cally low, both globally and in Norway. This is because 
there has been a need for an expansionary monetary 
policy, and because the level of the neutral real interest 
rate has declined over time. The neutral real interest 
rate is the rate that is neither expansionary nor contrac-
tionary. It cannot be observed and must be estimated. 
Model estimates as well as long-term domestic and 
foreign interest rates indicate that the neutral real inter-
est rate has remained low also in the past few years 
(Chart 5.2). The neutral real interest rate in Norway, 
measured as the three-month money market rate less 
inflation, is estimated to be close to 0%. The estimate 
is shrouded in considerable uncertainty.
5 Monetary policy analysis
The policy rate was kept unchanged at 1.50% at this monetary policy meeting, and the 
forecast indicates that the policy rate will remain close to the current level ahead.
The policy rate forecast is broadly unchanged from the September 2019 Monetary Policy 
Report. A weaker-than-projected krone suggests in isolation a higher policy rate path. On the 
other hand, the upswing in the Norwegian economy appears to be slightly more moderate 
than previously projected. In isolation, this pulls down the rate path.
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Chart 5.1 Consumer price index (CPI).           
Four-quarter change. Percent. 1982 Q1 – 2019 Q3
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank
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Chart 5.2 Model estimates of the neutral real interest rate in Norway.
Percent. 2001 – 2019                                                 
 1) Implicit five-year forward rates five years ahead based on interest rate swaps with five and ten years
maturity for Norway less the inflation target. 2) See Brubakk, L., J. Ellingsen, Ø. Robstad (2018)
"Estimates of the neutral rate of interest in Norway". Staff Memo 7/2018. Norges Bank. 3) The
underlying trend in interest rates in a Bayesian vector autoregressive model. 
Source: Norges Bank 
Market-based1)
State-space model (domestic inflation)2)
State-space model (wage growth)2)
VAR model with time-varying parameters2)
BVAR3)
Market-based: 13 December 2019
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The policy rate was kept low for a long time in order 
to stimulate economic activity and stabilise inflation 
close to the target. In recent years, there has been 
an upturn in the Norwegian economy and unemploy-
ment has moved down. Since September 2018, the 
policy rate has been raised gradually, and the mon-
etary stance has become less expansionary.
The money market rate has risen over the past year 
(Chart 5.3), in line with the increase in the policy rate. 
The real interest rate has also risen recently.
5.2 NEW INFORMATION AND ASSESSMENTS
Unchanged policy rate
Growth in the mainland economy slowed this autumn, 
but capacity utilisation is still somewhat above a 
normal level. Looking ahead, there are prospects that 
large investment projects on the Norwegian shelf will 
be completed. This will dampen growth in the Nor-
wegian economy. Underlying inflation has changed 
little in recent months and is close to the 2% inflation 
target. The krone depreciation will push up imported 
consumer goods inflation through 2020. At the same 
time, the social partners’ wage expectations indicate 
that wage growth will be moderate ahead.
Financial imbalances are no longer building up, and 
there are now some signs that they are receding. 
Household debt growth has abated over the past few 
years, and house price inflation has been moderate. 
Since the September Report, house price inflation and 
household debt growth have been a little lower than 
expected.
A policy rate that is too low over time may increase 
pressures in the economy, triggering an acceleration 
in wage and price inflation, and may contribute to the 
build-up of financial imbalances. On the other hand, 
a policy rate that is too high may dampen economic 
activity, resulting in higher unemployment and below-
target inflation.
The policy rate forecast in the September Report indi-
cated a rate close to the current level ahead. A model-
based analysis of new information suggests that with 
a policy rate forecast unchanged since September, 
inflation will increase slightly ahead, but remain close 
to the inflation target. Capacity utilisation will decline 
gradually towards a normal level (see box on page 
HOW TO INTERPRET THE POLICY 
RATE PATH
Norges Bank’s policy rate path is the Bank’s fore-
cast of the policy rate and expresses the interest 
rate that in the Bank’s opinion provides the best 
possible trade-off between monetary policy 
objectives. The rate path shows the Bank’s 
expected developments in the policy rate, given 
its current assessment of the state of the 
economy, outlook, balance of risks and function-
ing of the economy. The policy rate forecast is 
shrouded in considerable uncertainty. If the eco-
nomic outlook, balance of risks or the Bank’s 
assessment of the functioning of the economy 
change, the policy rate may turn out differently 
from the one indicated by the rate path. The fan 
around the rate path illustrates that uncertainty.
The policy rate path shows the forecast of the 
average policy rate for each quarter. The path in 
this Report lies between 1.50% and 1.60% 
throughout the projection period. As Norges 
Bank ordinarily changes the policy rate stepwise, 
often in quarter-percentage point increments, 
it will not be possible in practice for the average 
policy rate to be equal to level of the policy rate 
path.1 It is assumed at the outset that the uncer-
tainty surrounding the rate path is symmetrical.2 
Since the rate path is closer to 1.50% than 1.75%, 
the path can be interpreted to mean that there 
is a greater probability of the policy rate remain-
ing at 1.50% than being raised to 1.75% in the 
coming period. Moreover, the rate path is closer 
to 1.75% than 1.25%, indicating a greater prob-
ability of a rate hike than a rate cut in the coming 
period. Even though 1.50% is the most likely 
level of the policy rate in each quarter, there is 
little likelihood that the policy rate will remain 
unchanged throughout the projection period. 
The fan chart shows a significant probability that 
the policy rate will be raised or lowered in the 
coming years.
1 This would require raising the policy rate by less than 0.25 percen-
tage point or raising it first and then lowering it again in the same 
quarter.
2 As there is a lower bound on the policy rate, this assumption is 
not entirely correct, but is likely a good approximation close to the 
rate path.
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41). Compared with the September Report, capacity 
utilisation will be somewhat lower and inflation a little 
higher. New information provides no clear indications 
of a change in the policy rate path.
Trade tensions continue to be a source of consider-
able uncertainty about global developments, and 
foreign interest rates are very low. The krone has 
depreciated considerably, and the impact of the 
depreciation on price and wage inflation is uncertain. 
The Norwegian economy seems to be near a cyclical 
peak, where the rise in capacity utilisation is followed 
by a decline. The upswing may continue longer than 
envisaged if investment growth remains elevated 
ahead. On the other hand, growth may prove lower 
than projected, if, for example, global trade tensions 
deepen and oil prices fall.
The overall outlook and balance of risks suggest that 
the policy rate be kept unchanged at 1.50%. The fore-
cast indicates that the policy rate will remain at this 
level ahead (Chart 5.4).
Policy rate forecast broadly unchanged
The policy rate forecast is broadly unchanged from 
the September Report. The krone has been weaker 
than projected. A weaker krone will push up imported 
goods inflation and suggests in isolation a higher rate 
path. On the other hand, the upswing in the Norwe-
gian economy appears to be a little more moderate 
than envisaged in September. This suggests a lower 
rate path. The box on page 42 describes the factors 
behind the changes in the policy rate path.
Both the real and nominal interest rate can influence 
how monetary policy affects the Norwegian 
economy. In the analysis, the money market rate is 
assumed to change little through the projection 
period, in line with the policy rate forecast (Chart 3.1). 
In the projection, the real interest rate rises in the 
coming period before falling back a little through 2020 
owing to higher inflation (Chart 5.5).
Inflation is projected to be close to the inflation target 
in the years ahead, while capacity utilisation gradually 
declines towards a normal level. Employment remains 
high through the projection period, ie close to or 
above what is now considered to be potential employ-
ment (see box on page 37).
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Chart 5.5 Real interest rate.1) Percent. 2013 Q1 – 2022 Q32)
1) Three-month money market rate less a three-quarter centred moving average of four-quarter
inflation as measured by the CPI-ATE. 2) Projections for 2019 Q3 – 2022 Q3. 
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
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Chart 5.4 Policy rate. Percent. 2013 Q1 – 2022 Q41)
1) Projections for 2019 Q4 – 2022 Q4.
Source: Norges Bank                        
Projections MPR 4/19
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Chart 5.3 Three-month money market rate and real interest rates1). 
Percent. 2005 Q1 – 2019 Q3 2) 
1) Three-month money market rate deflated by a three-quarter centred moving average of four-quarter
inflation. 2) Projections for 2019 Q3. 
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
Three-month money market rate
Real interest rate, deflated by CPI
Real interest rate, deflated by CPI-ATE
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Chart 5.A CPI-ATE.1) Projections conditional on new information concerning
the economic development and the policy rate forecast in MPR 3/19.           
Four-quarter change. Percent. 2013 Q1 – 2022 Q42)                        
1) CPI adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy products. 2) Projections for 2019 Q4 –
 2022 Q4 
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
Projections MPR 3/19
New information
Inflation target
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Chart 5.A CPI-ATE.1) Projections conditional on new information concerning
the economic development and the policy rate forecast in MPR 3/19.           
Four-quarter change. Percent. 2013 Q1 – 2022 Q42)                        
1) CPI adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy products. 2) Projections for 2019 Q4 –
 2022 Q4 
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
Projections MPR 3/19
New information
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Chart 5.B Estimated output gap1). Conditional on new information concerning
the economic development and the policy rate forecast in MPR 3/19.            
Percent. 2013 Q1 – 2022 Q4                                                   
1) The output gap measures the percentage deviation between mainland GDP and estimated potential
mainland GDP.                                                                                        
Source: Norges Bank                                                                                  
Projections MPR 3/19
New information
MODEL-BASED INTERPRETATION OF NEW INFORMATION
In assessing the effects of new information and new assessments on the outlook for inflation and the 
output gap, a model-based exercise is performed where the policy rate forecast from the previous Report 
is held constant. Norges Bank’s macroeconomic model NEMO1 is used in this exercise, where updated 
projections for the current and next quarter are applied. For exogenous variables, updated projections for 
the entire projection period are used and comprise the following variables: foreign import growth, external 
inflation, foreign interest rates, oil prices, domestic money market premiums, domestic public demand and 
domestic petroleum investment.
The krone has for some time been weaker than projected in the Monetary Policy Report. The forecasts are 
based on the assumption that the conditions that have been weighing on the krone will contribute to keeping 
the krone weak in the years ahead. The weak krone may partly be explained by persistent global uncertainty. 
In the model estimations, this is interpreted as a risk premium on the Norwegian krone that gradually diminishes 
through the projection period. The deterioration in the terms of trade after the oil price fall in 2014 and uncer-
tainty surrounding the future activity level in the oil sector have also probably contributed to keeping the krone 
weak. In the model estimation, this is taken into account by adjusting the equilibrium exchange rate. A weaker 
equilibrium exchange rate and lower capacity utilisation implies slightly lower wage growth ahead. See box in 
MPR 1/19 for a detailed discussion of the effect in NEMO of an adjustment of the equilibrium exchange rate.
The model-based analysis suggests that with a policy rate forecast unchanged since September, CPI-ATE 
inflation will be a little higher through the projection period than projected in the September Report (Chart 
5.A). The upward revision is ascribable to higher imported inflation owing to a weaker krone. Lower wage 
growth contributes in isolation to slightly lower inflation.
Capacity utilisation will remain lower than in the September Report up until the beginning of 2022 (Chart 
5.B). This is primarily because the near-term projections have been revised down. Higher petroleum invest-
ment and higher exports owing to higher oil prices and a weaker-than-projected krone contribute in isola-
tion to slightly higher capacity utilisation.
Higher inflation and lower capacity utilisation have opposing effects on the policy rate outlook.
1 NEMO is described in Kravik, E.M and Y. Mimir (2019) “Navigating with NEMO”. Staff Memo 5/2019. Norges Bank.
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FACTORS BEHIND CHANGES IN THE POLICY RATE PATH
The main factors behind the changes in the rate path since the September Report are illustrated in Chart 
5.C. The bars show the various factors’ contributions. The black line shows the overall change in the policy 
rate forecast. The macroeconomic model NEMO is used as a tool for interpreting the driving forces in the 
economy, but there is no mechanical relationship between news that deviates from the Bank’s forecasts 
in the September Report and the effect on the new rate path.
The krone has been weaker than projected in the September Report. It is assumed that the conditions that 
have been weighing on the krone will contribute to keeping the krone weak in the years ahead. A weaker 
krone pulls up the rate path (orange bars).
Petroleum investment appears to be higher in the coming years than projected in the September Report 
and higher than implied by oil price developments in isolation. At the same time, residential mortgage rates 
have risen less than assumed, which points to slightly higher household consumption. In isolation, this 
pulls up the rate path slightly. On the other hand, house price inflation has been a little lower than expected. 
Moreover, employment growth is a little weaker than expected, and the upswing in the Norwegian economy 
appears to be a little more moderate than previously projected. Changes in demand overall pull down the 
rate path (dark blue bars).
Oil prices have risen since September. Higher oil prices lift activity in oil-related industries and pull up the 
rate path slightly (beige bars).
The money market premium has been lower than expected and is also expected to remain lower in the 
period ahead than projected in September. In isolation, this pulls the rate path up slightly (red bars).
Foreign forward rates are somewhat higher than in the September Report. On the other hand, it appears 
that trading partner import growth will be a little lower than expected and that external price and wage 
inflation will be lower than anticipated. The overall contribution of external growth, prices and foreign inter-
est rates to changes in the rate path is minimal.
In the Executive Board’s assessment, the overall outlook and balance of risks suggest a policy rate at close 
to the current level ahead. This implies a slightly lower policy rate path than indicated by the model-based 
analysis. The light blue bars reflect the Executive Board’s element of judgement .
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Chart 5.C Factors behind changes in policy rate forecast since MPR 3/19.
Cumulative contribution. Percentage points. 2020 Q1 – 2022 Q4          
Source: Norges Bank
Demand Money market premium
Exchange rate Oil price
Judgement Change in policy rate forecast
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MONETARY POLICY OBJECTIVES AND TRADE-OFFS
The operational target of monetary policy is annual consumer price inflation of close to 2% over time. Infla-
tion targeting shall be forward-looking and flexible so that it can contribute to high and stable output and 
employment and to counteracting the build-up of financial imbalances. The various considerations are 
weighed against each other.
The policy rate is set with a view to stabilising inflation around the target in the medium term. The horizon 
will depend on the disturbances to which the economy is exposed and the effects on the outlook for infla-
tion and for output and employment.
Monetary policy can contribute to stabilising output and employment at around the highest possible level 
consistent with price stability over time. This level is determined by structural conditions such as the tax 
and social security system, the system of wage formation and the composition of the labour force.
When shocks occur, a short-term trade-off may arise between reaching the inflation target and supporting 
high and stable output and employment. Monetary policy should achieve a reasonable trade-off between 
these considerations.
A flexible inflation-targeting regime, in which sufficient weight is given to the real economy, can prevent 
downturns from becoming deep and protracted. This can reduce the risk of unemployment becoming 
entrenched at a high level following an economic downturn.
If there are signs that financial imbalances are building up, the consideration of high and stable output and 
employment may in some situations suggest keeping the policy rate somewhat higher than would other-
wise be the case. To some extent, this can contribute to reducing the risk of sharp economic downturns 
further ahead. Nevertheless, the regulation and supervision of financial institutions are the primary means 
of addressing shocks to the financial system.
The conduct of monetary policy takes account of uncertainty regarding the functioning of the economy. 
Uncertainty surrounding the effects of monetary policy normally suggests a cautious approach to interest 
rate setting. This may reduce the risk that monetary policy will have unintended consequences. The policy 
rate will normally be changed gradually so that the effects of interest rate changes and other new informa-
tion about economic developments can be assessed.
In situations where the risk of particularly adverse outcomes is pronounced, or if there is no longer confi-
dence that inflation will remain low and stable, it may in some cases be appropriate to react more strongly 
in interest rate setting than normal.
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Norges Bank has advised the Ministry of Finance to keep the countercyclical capital buffer at 
2.5% from the end of 2019.1 The current countercyclical capital buffer of 2% and the decision 
to increase the buffer to 2.5% reflect the build-up of financial imbalances over a long period.  
In the Bank’s assessment, financial imbalances are no longer building up and there are now 
some signs that they are receding. Banks have good profitability, low losses and ample access 
to wholesale funding. Developments in credit growth and credit standards suggest that 
enterprises and households have ample access to credit. Banks satisfy the capital 
requirements and are well positioned to meet the announced capital requirements. The stress 
test in Financial Stability Report 2019 shows that banks have the capital to absorb large loan 
losses and that the increase in the countercyclical capital buffer from 2.0% to 2.5% will make 
it easier for the banking sector to maintain credit supply in the event of a downturn.
6.1 FINANCIAL IMBALANCES 
Financial imbalances no longer building up
Household debt-to-income ratios are high and prop-
erty prices are elevated. The high level of household 
debt is a key financial system vulnerability. Household 
debt growth has gradually slowed and is now close 
to growth in disposable income. Moderate house 
price inflation in recent years has reduced housing 
market vulnerabilities. The slower pace of debt growth 
and house price inflation may reflect bank credit 
standards requirements and interest rate increases 
over the past year. The rapid rise in commercial prop-
erty prices has slowed. Looking ahead, the higher 
interest rate level and moderate house price inflation 
are expected to continue to curb debt growth. Devel-
opments in the commercial real estate (CRE) market 
imply that prices will likely continue to rise more mod-
erately than previously. Our assessment is that finan-
cial imbalances are no longer building up and that 
there are now some signs that they are receding.
In its work to prepare the decision basis for the coun-
tercyclical capital buffer, the Bank analyses financial 
imbalances to assess time-varying systemic risk. 
Norges Bank’s heatmap is a useful starting point for 
such an analysis. The heatmap signals whether there 
1 See Norges Bank’s letter: Advice on the countercyclical capital buffer 
2019 Q4. Norges Bank published a revised framework for the elements 
that should be included in the decision basis for the Bank’s advice on the 
countercyclical capital buffer on 16 December 2019 (see box on page 54). 
The Bank’s advice is based on an assessment of the following four main 
areas: (i) developments in financial imbalances, (ii) access to credit, (iii) 
banks’ capacity to absorb losses and (iv) the effect of a change in the 
buffer requirement on banks and the economy.
are areas the Bank should focus on in particular. 
Developments in the CRE market and household debt 
service ratios, ie the ratio of interest and normal prin-
cipal payments to disposable income, have long sig-
nalled high risk, while recent developments in the 
housing market have signalled low risk (see box on 
page 53).2
High household debt is a key financial system 
vulnerability
In Norway, credit in the mainland economy has long 
risen faster than GDP (see credit indicator in Chart 
6.1), although the difference has narrowed in recent 
years. The credit gap, which shows the difference 
between the indicator and an estimated trend, is 
slightly higher than in 2018 Q3 (Chart 6.2).
Household debt-to-income ratios have been rising 
for a long period and are at a historically high level 
(Chart 6.3). Households are therefore vulnerable to a 
sharp fall in income or a marked rise in the interest 
rate level. Most households have the financial leeway 
to either defer principal payments, draw down finan-
cial buffers or tighten consumption if they are 
exposed to shocks. The risk of a large number of 
households tightening consumption at the same time 
constitutes a systemic risk. Norges Bank regards 
2 Non-bank financial institutions also signal high risk in the heatmap. One 
reason for this is the increase in credit to the private sector from life insu-
rance companies. In the Bank’s assessment, the increase does not give 
cause for concern because the increase is from low levels. Nevertheless, 
it is important to monitor developments because rising credit growth in 
the non-bank sector can be a source of systemic risk.
6 Financial stability assessment
– decision basis for the countercyclical capital buffer
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Chart 6.1 Credit as a share of GDP. Mainland Norway.
Percent. 1983 Q1 – 2019 Q3                         
Sources: IMF, Statistics Norway and Norges Bank
Domestic debt, households (C2)
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Chart 6.2 Decomposed credit gap. Credit as a share of GDP. Mainland Norway. 
Gap calculated as deviation from trend. Percentage points. 1983 Q1 – 2019 Q3 
Sources: IMF, Statistics Norway and Norges Bank
Domestic debt, households (C2)
Domestic debt, non-financial enterprises (C2)
Foreign debt, non-financial enterprises
Total credit
Crises
household debt as a key financial system vulnerabil-
ity in Norway (see Financial Stability Report 2019).
Household debt growth has gradually slowed in 
recent years and is now close to growth in disposable 
income (Chart 6.4). In early 2019, debt growth was at 
its lowest level for over 20 years. Debt growth has 
fallen further since then, to 5.0% in October, partly 
because the start of the period for converting student 
loans to grants was changed from November to July. 
Statistics Norway estimates that this will pull down 
12-month growth by 0.2 percentage point in the 
period to November 2019.
The policy rate rises in the past year have led to a 
slightly higher interest burden, ie the ratio of interest 
expenses to disposable income (Chart 6.3). However, 
although from a historical perspective the interest 
burden is still low because the interest rate level 
remains low, interest rate increases now have a 
stronger impact on household interest burdens than 
previously owing to high debt-to-income ratios. For 
any given loan term, a larger share of household dis-
posable income is being used for principal payments.
Tax assessment data for 2017, which are the most 
recent household data available, show that the share 
of households with a debt-to-income ratio above five 
and the share of debt held by these households 
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Chart 6.3 Household debt ratio, debt service ratio and interest burden. 
Percent. 1983 Q1 – 2019 Q3
300
1) Loan debt as a percentage of disposable income. 2) Interest expenses and estimated principal
payments as a percentage of disposable income and interest expenses. 3) Interest expenses as a
percentage of disposable income and interest expenses.
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank
Debt ratio1) (left-hand scale)
Debt service ratio2) (right-hand scale) 
Interest burden3) (right-hand scale)
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Chart 6.4 Credit to households and disposable income. Percent. 
January 2013 – October 2019 
1) Four-quarter change in the sum of the last four quarters in the series. To end-2019 Q3.
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank                                                     
Disposable income, four-quarter change1)
Credit to households, twelve-month change
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increased between 2016 and 2017 (Chart 6.5). Since 
then, household debt growth and house price inflation 
have been more moderate, which suggests that the 
build-up of vulnerabilities is slowing. On the other 
hand, the residential mortgage lending survey pub-
lished by Finanstilsynet (Financial Supervisory Author-
ity of Norway) indicates that the percentage of bor-
rowers and the percentage of the total loan amount 
that did not comply with the residential mortgage 
regulation’s debt-to-income ratio (DTI) requirements 
rose slightly in 2018 and 2019.
Consumer debt accounts for only 3%-4% of total 
household debt. Consumer credit growth was high 
for a long period, but has slowed markedly since the 
peak in 2016. It is likely that lower consumer credit 
growth reflects the introduction by the authorities of 
a number of measures to regulate consumer credit 
in recent years and the establishment of credit reg-
isters for unsecured debt.
In contrast to developments in household debt, cor-
porate debt developments signal low risk in Norges 
Bank’s heatmap. Aggregate mainland corporate debt 
grew markedly faster than GDP in the years prior to 
the banking and financial crisis, but has since been 
fairly stable at about 80%-85% of GDP (Chart 6.1). 
Compared with other countries, this is not very high.
Growth in mainland corporate credit from domestic 
sources picked up through 2017 and has since out-
paced GDP growth (Chart 6.6), reflecting growth in 
business investment (see Section 4.1), with 12-month 
growth at 7.2% in October.
Higher borrowing increases enterprises’ vulnerability 
to abrupt falls in revenue. At the same time, accord-
ing to accounting data up to 2018, enterprises as a 
whole appear to be less vulnerable now than in the 
years prior to the financial crisis (Chart 6.7). Equity 
ratios have risen steadily over the past ten years. 
Higher equity ratios increase enterprises’ resilience 
to large losses. In 2007 and 2008, enterprises’ bank 
debt grew markedly faster than revenues. Enterprises’ 
bank debt and revenues have grown at approximately 
the same pace in recent years.
Growth in credit to households has been slightly lower 
than projected, while growth in credit to enterprises 
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Chart 6.6 Domestic credit to non-financial enterprises and nominal GDP.
Mainland Norway. Percent. January 2013 – October 2019
1) Four-quarter change in the sum of the last four quarters in the series. To end-2019 Q3.
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank                                                     
Nominal GDP for mainland Norway, four-quarter change1)
Non-financial enterprises, twelve-month change
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Chart 6.7 Equity ratio and bank debt as a share of revenues for Norwegian-
registered non-financial limited liability companies.1)  Percent. 1999 – 2018
1) Only companies with total liabilities of more than NOK 1m. Enterprises involved in natural 
resource extraction are excluded.
Source: Norges Bank
Bank debt as a share of revenues
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Chart 6.5 Share of households with a DTI ratio1) above five and share of debt
held by these households. Percent. 1987 – 2017
1) Debt as a share of gross income. 
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
Debt
Households
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Chart 6.8 House prices. Twelve-month change. Percent.
January 2013 – November 2019
Sources: Eiendomsverdi, Finn.no, Real Estate Norway and Norges Bank
has been in line with the September projections. 
Looking ahead, the higher interest rate level and mod-
erate house price inflation are expected to continue 
to have a dampening effect on household debt 
growth (Annex Tables 3e and 4). In addition, growth 
in credit to enterprises is expected to gradually slow, 
in pace with declining business investment.
Reduced housing market vulnerabilities
House prices have risen substantially over a long 
period and are currently about 70% higher in nominal 
terms than at the peak prior to the financial crisis. 
High house prices are a key financial system vulner-
ability. House prices edged down through 2017, and 
house price inflation has since then been moderate 
(Chart 6.8), with 12-month house price inflation at 
between 2% and 4% in recent months. Owing to the 
rapid rise in house prices prior to 2017, the house price 
indicator, ie house prices relative to per capita dispos-
able income, is at a high level (Chart 6.9). Since 2017 
Q1, the indicator has fallen by 6%. A cooling housing 
market has reduced the risk of a sudden and more 
pronounced price fall further out, reducing housing 
market vulnerabilities somewhat compared with 2018.
Activity in the market for existing homes remains 
high. A large number of existing homes were listed 
for sale in 2019 and 2018, reflecting the large number 
of housing completions. The high supply of existing 
homes has resulted in a large stock of unsold existing 
homes (Chart 6.10). At the same time, turnover is high 
and the stock of unsold homes has decreased some-
what in recent months, also taking into account sea-
sonal variations.
Residential construction activity has been high for a 
number of years, and a large number of new homes 
were completed in 2018 (Chart 6.11). The Bank’s anal-
yses show that residential construction over time is 
not excessive relative to the rate of household forma-
tion and primarily takes place where household for-
mation is highest.3 There have been fewer housing 
completions than expected so far in 2019. It is 
assumed that developers have held back projects 
following a period of weaker new home sales, indicat-
ing a more rapid supply-side adjustment than previ-
3 See Monetary Policy Report 3/19 and Mæhlum, S., P. M. Pettersen and  
H. Xu (2018) “Residential construction and household formation”.  
Staff Memo 12/2018. Norges Bank.
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Chart 6.9 House prices relative to per capita disposable income (aged 15 – 74).
Index. 1998 Q4 = 100. 1983 Q1 – 2019 Q3                                        
Sources: Eiendomsverdi, Finn.no, Norwegian Association of Real Estate Agents (NEF), Real Estate
Norway, Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
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ously assumed. The Bank’s projections are now based 
on the assumption of a larger share of cancelled pro-
jects than assumed previously. But it is also assumed 
that some of the decline in the number of comple-
tions is delays or postponements of projects, with 
some of the projects taking longer than normal to 
complete.
House price inflation has been slightly lower than 
projected in the September Report. Looking ahead, 
the higher interest rate level and the large number of 
completed homes still on the market are expected 
to contribute to  continued moderate house price infla-
tion (Annex Tables 3d and 4).
From strong to moderate commercial property 
price inflation
High commercial property prices are one of the key 
financial system vulnerabilities. In Norway and many 
other countries, banks have incurred large losses on 
CRE exposures during financial crises. Within the CRE 
market, the office segment is especially important 
for financial stability since banks have substantial 
exposures to this segment. A relatively large share of 
the stock of office buildings is located in Oslo, and 
selling prices for prime office space in Oslo are there-
fore used as an important indicator of vulnerabilities 
in the CRE market. Historically, these prices have risen 
considerably ahead of financial crises.
Selling prices have risen sharply for a number of years, 
but the rise has slowed in the past year (Chart 6.12). 
Selling prices are calculated using observed rents and 
estimated yields. After many years of falling long-term 
interest rates and falling yields, CRE yields have 
remained more or less unchanged in recent years. 
Over the past two years, rents in Oslo have risen 
sharply (Chart 6.13).
The office segment in Oslo is heterogeneous, and 
limited data has made it difficult to assess the extent 
to which prices for prime office space are represent-
ative for the office segment as a whole and identify 
the drivers of rents and yields. A quality-adjusted 
rental price index has been developed by the Bank 
using quarterly rental data based on actual leases for 
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Chart 6.12 Real commercial property prices.1) 
Index. 1998 = 100. 1983 Q1 – 2019 Q3
300
1) Estimated real selling prices per square metre for prime office space in Oslo. Deflated by GDP deflator
for mainland Norway. Average for the previous four quarters.
Sources: CBRE, Dagens Næringsliv, OPAK, Statistics Norway and Norges Bank
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Chart 6.13 Office rents in Oslo. Four-quarter change, moving average over the
past four quarters. Percent. 2010 Q1 – 2019 Q3
1) Market rents according to CBRE. 2) Average rent in signed leases at lease signing date.
Sources: Arealstatistikk and CBRE
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Chart 6.11 Housing starts and completions, and annual change in number of households.
2005 – 2020 1)
1) Projections for 2019 and 2020.
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank
Number of housing starts
Number of completions
Change in number of households
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Chart 6.14 Office rental price indexes for Oslo. Four-quarter moving average. Index.
2011 Q1 = 100. 2005 Q1 – 2018 Q4                                                   
1) Market rents according to CBRE. 2) Average rent in signed leases at lease inception date.
Sources: Arealstatistikk, CBRE and Norges Bank                                                        
Rent index for prime office space in Oslo1)
Quality-adjusted rent index for Oslo as a whole2)
around two-thirds of the office market in Oslo.4 Such 
an index allows a more accurate comparison over 
time as it controls for property characteristics such 
as location and quality.
Rents for prime office space in Oslo have moved in 
the same direction as the quality-adjusted index for 
Oslo as a whole (Chart 6.14). At the same time, prime 
rents rose more sharply both during the financial crisis 
and around 2018. Higher volatility in prime rents is as 
expected and indicates that the willingness to pay for 
the best office space is more cyclical than for non-
prime office space. Rental developments in this 
segment can therefore provide a signal when risk is 
building up. The results support Norges Bank’s prac-
tice of using rents in the prime office space segment 
as an indicator of financial imbalances.
The difference in rent inflation between prime office 
space and Oslo as a whole in 2017–2018 suggests that 
the rise in selling prices was particularly strong in this 
segment in this period. According to market partici-
pants’ figures5, the decline in rental yields for the 
prime segment in the period 2015–2017 was also more 
pronounced than for the non-prime office segment. 
In sum, this indicates that selling prices for prime 
office space have for several years risen more rapidly 
than selling prices for office space in Oslo as a whole.6
The risk of a marked fall in selling prices will depend 
on whether rents and yields are in line with traditional 
explanatory variables. The Bank has constructed a 
model to analyse the drivers of office rents in Oslo. 
The model estimates an equilibrium rent based on 
developments in explanatory variables such as 
employment and the supply of office space.7 Chart 
6.15 shows that actual rents have tracked the esti-
mated equilibrium rent closely. In periods of deviation, 
the results indicate that rents quickly adjust back to 
the equilibrium. The results suggest that develop-
ments in the office rental market in Oslo as a whole 
are closely in line with developments in the economy. 
4 See box on page 22 of Financial Stability Report 2019 and Anundsen, A. 
and M. Hagen (2020) “Hedonic indices for rental prices in the Oslo office 
market”. Forthcoming in Norges Bank Working Papers.
5 See for example DNB Næringsmegling.
6 According to information from market participants, the decline in yields 
and the rise in rents have been more moderate in the other cities in 
Norway, which also indicates that selling prices in the rest of the country 
have shown a more moderate rise.
7 See Bjørland, C. and M. Hagen (2019) ˝What drives office rents?˝  
Staff Memo 12/2019. Norges Bank.
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Chart 6.15 Quality-adjusted rents and estimated equilibrium rent.1) Index.
2010 Q1 = 1. 2004 Q1 – 2018 Q2                                              
1) Average rent in signed leases at lease inception date from 2003 to 2006 and at lease signing date from
2007.                                                                                                         
Sources: Arealstatistikk and Norges Bank                                                                      
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Chart 6.15 Quality-adjusted rents and estimated equilibrium rent.1) Index.
2010 Q1 = 1. 2004 Q1 – 2018 Q2                                              
1) Average rent in signed leases at lease inception date from 2003 to 2006 and at lease signing date from
2007.                                                                                                         
Sources: Arealstatistikk and Norges Bank                                                                      
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Chart 6.16 Risk premiums in Norway. Five-year maturity, basis points over
three-month Nibor.1) Week 32 2015 – week 50 2019 2)
1) Risk premiums on bonds issued by large banks and mortgage companies in the Norwegian 
market. 2) MPR 3/19 was based on information in the period up to and including 13 September 
2019, indicated by the vertical line.
Source: Nordic Bond Pricing
Senior bonds
Covered bonds
49
NORGES BANK MONETARY POLICY REPORT 4/2019
This implies that a marked fall in rents wil not occur 
unless explained by conditions in the real economy.
Commercial property price inflation in Oslo is 
expected to remain moderate ahead. Office vacancy 
rates are low, but market participants8 expect vacancy 
rates to edge up in the coming years, resulting in a 
somewhat slower rise in rents, partly owing to a 
higher supply of new office buildings in Oslo. Market 
participants also expect prime yields in Oslo to remain 
low, driven by strong demand for attractive invest-
ment opportunities and continued low long-term 
interest rates.
6.2 BANKS’ ADJUSTMENT AND ACCESS TO 
CREDIT
The stress test in Financial Stability Report 2019 
shows that banks have the capital to absorb large 
loan losses and that the increase in the countercycli-
cal capital buffer from 2.0% to 2.5% will make it easier 
for the banking sector to maintain credit supply in the 
event of a downturn (see box on page 52).
Bank funding conditions do not appear to be a con-
straint on lending. Banks have ample access to long-
term funding in Norwegian and in international finan-
cial markets. The risk premiums Norwegian banks 
pay for senior bonds and covered bonds are little 
changed since the September Report (Chart 6.16).
Banks’ profitability influences their capacity to absorb 
losses and their lending capacity. Major Norwegian 
banks have maintained profitability over the past year, 
and profitability is at a high level compared with other 
European banks. Return on equity fell in 2019 Q3 com-
pared with Q1 and Q2 (Chart 6.17), primarily reflecting 
high extraordinary revenues in Q1 and Q2 that 
boosted return on equity in these quarters. Credit 
losses increased in Q3, primarily owing to losses on 
a single DNB exposure. Banks’ credit losses in the 
past year are still low from a historical perspective 
(Chart 6.18).
These developments indicate that banks will be able 
to accommodate households’ and enterprises’ credit 
demand ahead. Growth in credit to enterprises from 
all the banking groups has increased in recent months, 
pushed up in particular by DNB and branches of 
8 See Entra’s Consensus Report for 2019 Q3.
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Chart 6.18 Loan losses as a share of gross loans to customers. All banks and
mortgage companies in Norway. Percent. 1987 Q1 – 2019 Q3
Source: Norges Bank
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Chart 6.19 Credit to Norwegian non-financial enterprises. Contribution to
twelve-month growth in holdings from various sources of funding. Percent. 
January 2015 – October 2019 
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank
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Chart 6.17 Return on equity for large Norwegian banks.
Percent. 2009 Q1 – 2019 Q3                           
Sources: Banks' quarterly reports and Norges Bank
Quarterly return on equity (annualised)
Four-quarter moving average
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foreign banks. In Norges Bank’s Survey of Bank 
Lending, banks report unchanged credit standards 
and lending conditions for both households and 
enterprises in 2019 Q3. Banks also expect credit 
standards to remain unchanged ahead. Enterprises 
also appear to have ample access to bond market 
credit, even though the contribution to lending 
growth from the bond market has been low compared 
with the contribution from other sources of funding 
(Chart 6.19).
The countercyclical capital buffer will increase from 
2.0% to 2.5% at year-end 2019. Norwegian banks’ 
Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital ratios, ie CET1 
capital as a share of risk-weighted assets, have 
increased considerably since the financial crisis (Chart 
6.20). CET1 capital as a percentage of total assets has 
also increased. Owing to higher capital ratios, banks 
are now more resilient to losses and market turbu-
lence. Upon incorporation of the EU capital framework 
(CRR/CRD IV) into Norwegian law on 31 December 
2019, the Basel I floor will no longer apply and the SME 
discount will be introduced in Norway. When the 
Basel I floor is removed, risk-weighted assets will 
decrease for banks applying risk weights calculated 
using the IRB approach.9 The SME discount reduces 
banks’ capital requirements for lending to small and 
medium-sized enterprises. For most large banks, the 
removal of the Basel I floor and the introduction of 
the SME discount will entail a reduction in risk-
weighted assets and thus lead to an increase in CET1 
capital ratios. Leverage ratios, ie CET1 capital as a 
share of total assets, will not show a corresponding 
increase. To prevent an undesirable fall in banks’ lev-
erage ratios, the Ministry of Finance has decided to 
increase the systemic risk buffer from 3.0% to 4.5% 
and introduce temporary average risk weight floors 
for residential and CRE exposures. These changes in 
the capital requirements will be effective from end-
2020. For smaller banks, the new requirements will 
not apply until end-2022. Considering the expected 
regulatory amendments, banks are well positioned 
to meet the capital targets without having to tighten 
credit standards.
9 For more on the capital framework, see Annex 2 in Norway’s financial 
system 2019.
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Chart 6.20 Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital ratio and CET 1 capital as a
share of total assets1). Norwegian banks. Percent. 1997 – 2019 Q3
1) Consolidated figures are used for banks that are banking groups. Parent bank figures are used for
the other banks. 
Source: Finanstilsynet (Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway) 
CET 1 ratio
CET 1 / total assets
2019 Q3
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THE STRESS TEST IN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 2019
Historical experience and empirical analyses show that crises and downturns are more severe when pre-
ceded by a build-up of financial imbalances.1 Banks’ capacity to absorb losses must therefore be assessed 
in the light of the level of financial imbalances. The stress test in Financial Stability Report 2019 analyses 
the impact of a severe economic downturn on banks’ credit losses, capital ratios and behaviour.2 In the 
stress test scenario, financial imbalances have built up over a long period. The macro bank’s3 CET1 capital 
ratio falls markedly in this scenario (Chart 6.A). The fall in the capital ratio is reduced by the macro bank’s 
adjustment to meet the capital requirement, partly by tightening new lending. This amplifies the downturn. 
However, reducing the countercyclical capital buffer rate from 2.5% to 0% dampens the downturn. If the 
buffer had been kept at 2.5%, banks would have had to tighten lending further in order to comply with the 
requirement. The result would have been somewhat weaker GDP growth and a substantial fall in credit 
supply (Chart 6.B).
The analysis shows the importance of having sufficient time-varying capital buffers before a financial crisis 
occurs. The increase in the countercyclical capital buffer from 2.0% to 2.5% will make it easier for the banking 
sector to maintain credit supply in the event of a future downturn (Chart 6.B).
1 See for example Jordà, O., M. Schularick and A. Taylor (2013) “When Credit Bites Back”. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 45(2), December, pp. 3–28.
2 A detailed description of the stress test framework is presented in Andersen, H., K. Gerdrup, R. M. Johansen and T. Krogh (2019) “A macroprudential 
stress testing framework”. Staff Memo 1/2019. Norges Bank.
3 The macro bank is the sum of nine large banks in Norway.
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Chart 6.A The macro bank's Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio and the CET1
ratio requirement under Pillar 1 and Pillar 21) under different assumptions about
developments in banks' capital requirements. Percent. 2018 – 20232) 
1) Pillar 2 requirements for the banks in the stress test are weighted by their risk-weighted assets. 
2) Projections for the stress period 2019 – 2023. 
Sources: Finanstilsynet (Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway), SNL / S&P MI and Norges Bank 
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Without reduction in countercyclical buffer rate
Stress scenario Without reduction in countercyclical
buffer rate                         
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Chart 6.B Total change through the stress period in mainland GDP and credit
under different assumptions about developments in banks' capital requirements.1)
Percent 
1) Defined as the cumulative deviation from an estimated trend for GDP and the deviation from an
estimated trend at the end of the stress period for total credit. Trend GDP growth at constant prices is set
at 1.2% and trend credit growth is set at 3.7%. 
Source: Norges Bank 
Mainland GDP
Credit
Additional change if the banks had made their adjustments
to a countercyclical capital buffer requirement of 2.0%
instead of 2.5%
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A HEATMAP FOR MONITORING SYSTEMIC RISK
Norges Bank’s ribbon heatmap is a tool for assessing time-varying systemic risk in the Norwegian financial 
system. The heatmap tracks developments in a broad set of indicators for three main areas: risk appetite 
and asset valuations, the non-financial sector (households and enterprises) and the financial sector.1
Developments in each individual indicator are mapped into a common colour coding scheme, where green 
(red) reflects low (high) levels of vulnerability. The heatmap thus provides a visual representation of systemic 
risk in the Norwegian financial system compared with historical episodes. The composite indicators are 
constructed by averaging individual indicators.
1 For a detailed description of the heatmap and the individual indicators, see Arbatli, E.C. and R.M. Johansen (2017) “A Heatmap for Monitoring Systemic 
Risk in Norway”. Staff Memo 10/2017. Norges Bank. See also box on page 54 of Monetary Policy Report 4/17.
Chart 6.C Composite Indicators in the heatmap 1980 Q1 – 2019 Q3
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Global financial cycle
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Financial  
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Sources: BIS, Bloomberg, CBRE, Dagens Næringsliv, DNB Markets, Eiendomsverdi, Finn.no, Norwegian Association of Real Estate Agents (NEF), OECD, OPAK, Real Estate Norway, Statistics Norway, 
Thomson Reuters and Norges Bank
Financial crisis
Banks – Growth in assets and equity ratio
Banks – Funding
Banks – Connectedness
Non-bank financial institutions
Households – Credit gap
Households – Debt service
Households – Credit growth
Non-financial enterprises – Credit gap
Non-financial enterprises – Debt service
Non-financial enterprises – Credit growth
Sources: BIS, Bloomberg, CBRE, Dagens Næringsliv, DNB Markets, Eiendomsverdi, Finn.no, Norwegian Association of Real Estate Agents (NEF), OECD, OPAK, Real Estate 
Norway, Statistics Norway, Thomson Reuters Datastream and Norges Bank
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Chart 6.B Total change through the stress period in mainland GDP and credit
under different assumptions about developments in banks' capital requirements.1)
Percent 
1) Defined as the cumulative deviation from an estimated trend for GDP and the deviation from an
estimated trend at the end of the stress period for total credit. Trend GDP growth at constant prices is set
at 1.2% and trend credit growth is set at 3.7%. 
Source: Norges Bank 
Mainland GDP
Credit
Additional change if the banks had made their adjustments
to a countercyclical capital buffer requirement of 2.0%
instead of 2.5%
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NORGES BANK’S ADVICE ON THE COUNTERCYCLICAL CAPITAL BUFFER
Norges Bank is responsible for preparing a decision basis and advising the Ministry of Finance on the level 
of the countercyclical capital buffer for banks four times a year. The countercyclical capital buffer shall as 
a rule be set at between 0% and 2.5% of banks’ risk-weighted assets, but may be set higher in exceptional 
circumstances. Norges Bank published a revised framework for the elements that should be included in 
the decision basis for Norges Bank’s advice on 16 December 2019 (see Norges Bank Papers 4/2019).
Banks should build up and hold a countercyclical capital buffer when financial imbalances are building up 
or have built up. Large financial imbalances entail a risk of an abrupt decline in demand from households 
and enterprises and large bank losses. The buffer should be activated at an early stage if there are signs 
that financial imbalances are increasing.
The objective of the buffer is to increase banks’ resilience to losses in a downturn and should not be changed 
frequently in an attempt to manage credit growth or asset prices. The buffer rate should not necessarily 
be reduced even if there are signs that financial imbalances are receding. If financial imbalances recede 
substantially over time and the financial stability outlook is favourable, a reduction of the buffer could be 
considered. In the event of a severe downturn and clearly reduced access to credit, the buffer rate should 
be lowered to counteract tighter bank lending. The buffer requirement should be viewed in the light of 
banks’ adjustment to the overall capital requirements.
Advice regarding the level of the countercyclical capital buffer is based on an assessment of four main 
areas:
• Financial imbalances are analysed to assess cyclical systemic risk that could trigger or amplify a severe 
downturn.
• Access to credit is analysed to assess whether there is or may be a need to reduce the buffer because 
creditworthy enterprises and households are not able to obtain credit.
• Banks’ capacity to absorb losses is analysed to assess whether the level of the buffer is sufficient given 
the assessment of financial imbalances.
• The effect of a change in the buffer rate on banks and the economy is assessed before advice is given 
on whether to change the buffer rate.
The decision basis for Norges Bank’s advice is presented in Section 6 of the Monetary Policy Report with 
financial stability assessment. In addition, a fixed set of indicators is updated on Norges Bank’s website. 
The assessments and the advice on the level of the countercyclical buffer are based on judgement in addi-
tion to indicators and quantitative analyses. The advice is sent to the Ministry of Finance in connection with 
the publication of the Report and is published when the Ministry of Finance has made its decision.
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Monetary policy meetings in Norges Bank
Tables and detailed projections
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Monetary policy meetings in Norges Bank
Date1 Policy rate2 Change
18 March 2020
22 January 2020
18 December 2019 1.50 0
23 October 2019 1.50 0
18 September 2019 1.50 0.25
14 August 2019 1.25 0
19 June 2019 1.25 0.25
8 May 2019 1.00 0
20 March 2019 1.00 0.25
23 January 2019 0.75 0
12 December 2018 0.75 0
24 October 2018 0.75 0
19 September 2018 0.75 0.25
15 August 2018 0.50 0
20 June 2018 0.50 0
2 May 2018 0.50 0
14 March 2018 0.50 0
24 January 2018 0.50 0
13 December 2017 0.50 0
25 October 2017 0.50 0
20 September 2017 0.50 0
21 June 2017 0.50 0
3 May 2017 0.50 0
14 March 2017 0.50 0
14 December 2016 0.50 0
26 October 2016 0.50 0
21 September 2016 0.50 0
22 June 2016 0.50 0
11 May 2016 0.50 0
16 March 2016 0.50 -0.25
16 December 2015 0.75 0
4 November 2015 0.75 0
23 September 2015 0.75 -0.25
17 June 2015 1.00 -0.25
6 May 2015 1.25 0
18 March 2015 1.25 0
10 December 2014 1.25 -0.25
22 October 2014 1.50 0
17 September 2014 1.50 0
1 The interest rate decision has been published on the day following the monetary policy meeting as from the monetary policy meeting on 13 March 2013. 
The interest rate decision at the monetary policy meeting on 14 March 2017 was published two days after the meeting.
2  The policy rate is the interest rate on banks’ sight deposits in Norges Bank. This interest rate forms a floor for money market rates. 
By managing banks’ access to liquidity, Norges Bank ensures that short-term money market rates are normally slightly higher than the policy rate.
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Table 1 Projections for GDP growth in other countries
Change from projections in 
 Monetary Policy Report 3/19 
in brackets
Share of 
world GDP1
Trading 
 partners4
Percentage change from previous year
PPP
Market 
exchange 
rates 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
US 16 25 9 2.9 (0) 2.3 (0.1) 2 (0.3) 1.7 (0) 1.7 (0)
Euro area 12 16 33 1.9 (0) 1.2 (0.1) 1.2 (0) 1.4 (0) 1.3 (-0.2)
UK 2 4 10 1.4 (0) 1.3 (0.2) 1.2 (0.2) 1.4 (0) 1.4 (-0.1)
Sweden 0.4 0.7 12 2.3 (-0.1) 1.4 (-0.1) 1.2 (-0.2) 1.6 (-0.1) 1.8 (0)
Other advanced economies2 7 10 18 2.2 (0.2) 1.5 (0.1) 1.6 (0.3) 1.8 (0) 1.8 (0)
China 16 15 6 6.6 (0) 6.1 (0.1) 5.8 (0.1) 5.7 (0) 5.6 (0)
Other emerging economies3 19 11 12 3.8 (0.1) 2.7 (0.1) 3.8 (0.2) 3.9 (0.1) 3.9 (0)
Trading partners4 72 79 100 2.7 (0.1) 1.9 (0.1) 1.9 (0.1) 2 (0) 2 (-0.1)
World (PPP)5 100 3.6 (0) 3 (-0.1) 3.3 (-0.1) 3.5 (0) 3.6 (0)
World (market exchange rates)5 100 3.2 (0.1) 2.6 (0.1) 2.7 (0) 2.9 (0.1) 2.9 (0)
1 Country’s share of global output measured in a common currency. Average 2015–2017.
2 Other advanced economies in the trading partner aggregate: Denmark, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Switzerland. Export weights.
3 Emerging economies in the trading partner aggregate excluding China: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Poland, Russia, Thailand and Turkey. 
GDP weights (market exchange rates) are used to reflect the countries’ contribution to global growth.
4 Export weights, 25 main trading partners.
5 GDP weights, three-year moving average.
Sources: IMF, Thomson Reuters and Norges Bank
Table 2 Projections for consumer prices in other countries
Change from projections in 
Monetary Policy Report 3/19 
in brackets
Trading 
 partners4
Percentage change from previous year
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
US 8 2.4 (0) 1.8 (0) 2.2 (-0.1) 2.3 (0) 2.3 (0)
Euro area 33 1.8 (0) 1.2 (0) 1.2 (-0.1) 1.5 (0) 1.6 (0)
UK 6 2.3 (0) 1.7 (-0.2) 1.7 (-0.4) 1.9 (-0.2) 2 (0)
Sweden1 13 2.1 (0) 1.7 (0) 1.8 (0) 1.9 (0) 2 (0)
Other advanced economies2 17 1 (-0.1) 0.6 (-0.1) 1.1 (-0.2) 1.4 (-0.2) 1.6 (0)
China 12 2.1 (0) 2.8 (0.4) 2.3 (0) 2.6 (0) 2.6 (0)
Other emerging economies3 10 4.4 (0) 4.5 (-0.3) 4.4 (-0.3) 4.3 (-0.2) 4.2 (-0.3)
Trading partners4 100 2 (0) 1.8 (0) 1.8 (-0.2) 2 (-0.1) 2.1 (0)
Underlying inflation5 1.4 (0) 1.4 (0) 1.6 (-0.1) 1.8 (0) 1.8 (0)
Wage growth6 2.6 (0) 2.4 (-0.1) 2.7 (-0.1) 2.7 (-0.1) 2.7 (-0.1)
Prices for consumer goods imported to 
Norway7
1.4 (0) 1.7 (-0.1) 0.6 (0) 0.6 (0) 0.7 (0)
1 Consumer price index with a fixed interest rate (CPIF).
2 Other advanced economies in the trading partner aggregate: Denmark, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Switzerland. Import weights.
3 Emerging economies in the trading partner aggregate excluding China: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Poland, Russia, Thailand and Turkey. 
GDP weights (market exchange rates).
4 Import weights, 25 main trading partners.
5 The aggregate for underlying inflation includes: the euro area, Sweden, UK and US. Import weights.
6 Projections for compensation per employee in the total economy. The aggregate includes: the euro area, Sweden, UK and US. Import weights.
7  Measured in foreign currency terms. Including compositional effects.
Sources: IMF, Thomson Reuters and Norges Bank
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Table 3b GDP for mainland Norway. 
Quarterly change. Seasonally adjusted. Percent
2019 2020
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Actual 0.7 0.7
Projections 
in MPR 3/19 1.0 0.5
Projections 
in MPR 4/19 0.4 0.5
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank
Table 3c Registered unemployment (rate). 
Percent of labour force. Seasonally adjusted
2019 2020
Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar
Actual 2.2 2.2 2.2
Projections 
in MPR 3/19 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2
Projections 
in MPR 4/19 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2
Sources: Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV) and Norges Bank
Table 3d House prices. 
Twelve-month change. Percent
2019 2020
Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar
Actual 2.6 2.4 3.1
Projections 
in MPR 3/19 2.5 2.8 3.5 3.1
Projections 
in MPR 4/19 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.5
Sources: Eiendomsverdi, Finn.no, Real Estate Norway and Norges Bank
Table 3e Credit to households. 
Twelve-month change. Percent
2019 2020
Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar
Actual 5.2 5.1 5.0
Projections 
in MPR 3/19 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.5 5.5
Projections 
in MPR 4/19 5.2 5.2 5.1 5.1 5.0
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank
Table 3a Consumer prices. Twelve-month change. Percent
2019 2020
Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar
Consumer price index (CPI)
Actual 1.5 1.8 1.6
Projections in MPR 3/19 1.4 1.8 1.4 1.5
Projections in MPR 4/19 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.9
CPI-ATE1
Actual 2.2 2.2 2.0
Projections in MPR 3/19 2.1 2.3 2.0 2.0
Projections in MPR 4/19 1.9 2.2 1.8 1.9
Imported consumer goods in the CPI-ATE
Actual 1.2 0.9 0.8
Projections in MPR 3/19 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1
Projections in MPR 4/19 0.8 1.7 0.7 1.1
Domestically produced goods and services in the CPI-ATE2
Actual 2.6 2.7 2.5
Projections in MPR 3/19 2.4 2.7 2.4 2.3
Projections in MPR 4/19 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2
1 CPI adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy products.
2 The aggregate ”domestically produced goods and services in the CPI-ATE” is calculated by Norges Bank.
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank
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Table 4 Projections for main economic aggregates
Change from projections in 
Monetary Policy Report 3 /19 in brackets
In billions 
of NOK 
2018
Percentage change from previous year (unless otherwise stated)
2018
Projections
2019 2020 2021 2022
Prices and wages
Consumer price index (CPI) 2.7 (0) 2.2 (0) 2.2 (0.2) 2.2 (0) 2.2 (0)
CPI-ATE1 1.6 (0) 2.3 (0) 2.2 (0.1) 2.3 (0.1) 2.2 (0)
Annual wages 2.8 (0) 3.4 (0.1) 3.2 (-0.1) 3.2 (-0.1) 3.3 (-0.1)
Real economy2
Gross domestic product (GDP) 3531 1.5 (-0.1) 1.0 (-0.3) 2.4 (0.2) 2.0 (0.1) 1.6 (0)
GDP, mainland Norway 2907 2.5 (-0.1) 2.5 (-0.2) 1.9 (0) 1.4 (0.1) 1.4 (0.1)
Output gap, mainland Norway (level)3 -0.2 (0) 0.3 (-0.1) 0.3 (-0.2) 0.2 (-0.1) 0.1 (0)
Employment, persons, QNA 1.7 (0) 1.7 (-0.1) 1.1 (-0.1) 0.4 (0.1) 0.4 (0.1)
LFS unemployment4 (rate, level) 3.8 (0) 3.6 (0.1) 3.5 (0.1) 3.5 (0) 3.6 (0.1)
Registered unemployment (rate, level) 2.5 (0) 2.3 (0) 2.2 (0) 2.3 (0.1) 2.3 (0)
Demand2
Mainland demand5 3062 2.1 (0) 2.3 (0.3) 1.4 (-0.4) 1.4 (-0.1) 1.6 (-0.1)
- Household consumption6 1538 2.0 (0) 1.6 (-0.2) 1.6 (-0.7) 2.0 (-0.1) 2.1 (-0.1)
- Business investment 311 6.8 (0) 5.5 (1.7) 0.1 (-2.5) 0.0 (-0.4) 0.9 (-0.3)
- Housing investment 194 -6.1 (0) 1.0 (0.1) 0.5 (-0.1) 1.1 (0) 1.8 (0.3)
- Public demand7 1020 2.5 (0) 2.7 (0.8) 1.8 (0.6) 1.2 (0) 1.2 (0)
Petroleum investment8 153 1.9 (0) 14.5 (0) 4.5 (2.0) -5.0 (-1.0) -4.0 (2.0)
Mainland exports9 661 3.3 (-0.1) 6.0 (0.8) 2.4 (0.1) 3.0 (0.2) 3.2 (0)
Imports 1155 1.9 (0) 6.3 (2.0) 2.2 (1.0) 1.8 (-0.7) 2.1 (-0.3)
House prices and debt
House prices10 0.7 (0) 2.6 (-0.1) 2.7 (0.1) 3.4 (0.2) 3.4 (0.1)
Credit to households (C2)11 5.6 (0) 5.2 (-0.3) 5.2 (-0.2) 5.1 (-0.6) 4.9 (-0.9)
Interest rate and exchange rate (level)
Policy rate12 0.6 (0) 1.1 (0) 1.6 (0) 1.6 (0) 1.6 (0.1)
Import-weighted exchange rate (I-44)13 104.6 (0) 107.7 (0.7) 109.0 (2.2) 108.1 (1.7) 108.0 (1.7)
Money market rates, trading partners14 0.4 (0) 0.5 (0) 0.3 (0) 0.3 (0.1) 0.4 (0.1)
Oil price
Oil price, Brent Blend. USD per barrel15 71 (0) 64 (1) 62 (5) 59 (3) 57 (1)
1 CPI adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy products.
2 All figures are working day-adjusted.
3 The output gap measures the percentage deviation between mainland GDP and projected potential mainland GDP.
4 Labour Force Survey.
5 Household consumption and private mainland gross fixed investment and public demand.
6 Includes consumption for non-profit organisations.
7 General government gross fixed investment and consumption.
8 Extraction and pipeline transport.
9 Traditional goods, travel, petroleum services and exports of other services from mainland Norway.
10 Change from previous period does not correspond to annual change in MPR 3/19 owing to errors in the calculation of annual change in the September Report.
11 Credit growth is calculated as the four-quarter change at year-end.
12 The policy rate is the interest rate on banks’ deposits in Norges Bank.
13 The weights are estimated on the basis of imports from 44 countries, which comprise 97% of total imports. A higher value denotes a weaker krone exchange rate.
13 Based on three-month money market rates and interest rate swaps.
15 Spot price for 2018. The price for 2019 is calculated as the average spot price so far in 2019. Futures prices for 2020–2022. Futures prices at 13 December 2019.
Sources: Eiendomsverdi, Finn.no, Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV), Real Estate Norway, Statistics Norway, Thomson Reuters and Norges Bank
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